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## ON THE FEATURES OF RUSSIA'S NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY

**Abstract:** In the article, the authors conducted a study of the new development policy of the Far East according to the criteria of compliance with the developmental state model and proposed an explanation for the identified deviations. It is shown that the transformation of goals in Far Eastern policy, the expansion of its spatial and content coverage, as well as the growth of the simulation component, are largely caused by the multitasking and structural weakness of the Ministry of the Russian Federation for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic, its struggle to maintain positions among other ministries and departments.

The research is based on open sources, archival documents and a series of anonymous semi-structured interviews with representatives of government bodies, municipalities, employees of development institutions and resident entrepreneurs of territories of rapid socio-economic development.

**Key words:** regional development, state, Far East, priority development territories, Far Eastern politics, bureaucracy, development institutions.

**Language:** English

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### Introduction

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Entertion

The secret version of the new American National Defense Strategy (NDS) was approved at the end of

March 2022. Then it was supplemented with a brief open reference of one and a half pages. More than six months passed before the open version of NSO 2022 was presented to the American and world public. This caused some outrage in Congress, as it complicated the budget process. In mid-October, the first National

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Security Strategy (NSS) of the Biden administration was published, and two weeks later, the public version of the 2022 NSS was published. Simultaneously with NSO-2022, the Nuclear Posture Review and the Missile Defense Policy Review were also published as part of a single package of documents. NSC 2022 defined the strategic framework and goal setting for the NSO. NSC 2022 recorded the end of the post-bipolar era, the intensification of competition between great powers for the right to determine a new image of the world; tightening of ideological and military-political confrontation between “free countries” and “anti-democratic forces”. China is identified as the key and Russia as the most acute threat to the national security of the United States and the US-led “free world.” The second strategic challenge, along with the intensification of competition between great powers, is the cross-border challenges common to all states (climate change, pandemics of infectious diseases, uncontrolled migration, food supply, corruption). The 2022 NSC is based on a rejection of the isolationist tendencies of the Trump era and a return to the forefront of the role of allies and partnerships. Before moving on to the consideration of NSO-2022, it is worth considering the role and significance of the document in the American strategic planning system. In the American hierarchy of strategic planning documents, the NSO is the most significant specialized addition to the NSS. The predecessors were the annual reports of the Secretary of Defense to Congress and the President, the preparation of which ceased in 2005 with the publication of the first NSO. At the same time, for a decade the NSO existed in parallel with the Quadrennial Defense Policy Reviews, which were developed from 1997 to 2014. The NSO is currently being prepared in accordance with the 2017 law, replacing previous reports and reviews.

Issues of defense, military planning and the defense-industrial complex have traditionally occupied an important place in American politics and economics, and reliance on military force is one of the pillars of military-political strategy. But it is necessary to understand the limitations and specifics of this document, especially its public version. To a large extent, NSO is not a pure strategy. The strategy must define a specific goal (or goals), as well as tools, methods of their application and an action plan to achieve the goal in specific conditions and taking into account limited resources. NSO is very broad and general in nature. It is tied to the current strategic environment, but avoids specifics, complex decisions and compromises, and a detailed consideration of the action plan and activities aimed at achieving stated goals. The reasons are clear - documents like the NSO are themselves perceived as a declarative political manifesto of the administration, which goes through a long process of approval within bureaucratic structures, and ultimately turns into a tool for

lobbying, consolidation and communication. NSO is aimed at a large and heterogeneous audience - the leadership of the Armed Forces (AF), Congress, American citizens, the expert community, corporations, foreign politicians, military personnel and experts. As well as supporters and opponents of the current presidential administration, partners, allies and opponents of the United States on the world stage. NSO combines the features of various genres - vision, doctrine, concept, political declaration. When developing it, they try to avoid unnecessary and inconvenient questions and leave maximum room for maneuver for the administration. This is a convenient tool for solving current problems of the administration in general and the Pentagon in particular in Congress and in the diplomatic arena. The NSO should perhaps be called “defense policy framework.” The word “strategy” in the title of the document has more to do with the breadth of coverage (it is truly strategic in nature) and the high hierarchical level - above the NSO, especially after the disappearance of competition from the Quadrennial Defense Policy Reviews, there is only the NSC.

Another factor contributing to the hollowing out of the NSO as a document is the increased emphasis on secrecy in matters related to defense and national security. In this regard, many specific details and aspects of military construction, the structure and strength of the armed forces, as well as technological development remain outside the scope of the public version of the strategy.

Finally, the American bureaucracy, especially the Pentagon and the defense-industrial complex closely associated with it, is a very ponderous, inertial and tenacious system. Compared to the decades-long life cycle of key modern military programs, such as the creation of a new fighter jet or submarine, the life span of the presidential administration is quite short. Often, even sincere attempts by the new administration to implement any meaningful changes are unsuccessful because they come up against issues of national security, secrecy, hundreds of thousands of people involved and billions of dollars. One can recall Donald Trump’s plans to seriously increase the number of ships in the US Navy, which in fact existed in the bowels of the US Department of the Navy long before Trump came to the White House, and if they are implemented, then by that time more than one administration will have changed; or Joe Biden’s promises to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in American strategy, which, as the 2022 nuclear weapons program showed, remained just words.

It is not surprising that some American experts consistently criticize and even call for the abandonment of the institution of strategies as a set of top-level strategic planning documents.

The NSO should be viewed as an ideologized, concise presentation of the views of the Secretary of Defense and his team on the strategic environment, the

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challenges facing the United States, and the goals and objectives of national defense policy, avoiding sharp edges and political rough edges. The NSO serves as the justification for the titanic annual budget process, which ensures the formation of American military power in the medium and long term and on the margins of which the presidential administration and Congress often collide in very fierce battles.

It is in the context of the process of developing and adopting the annual military budget in the form of the fundamental law on budgetary appropriations for national defense that the true role of the NSC and NSO as the tip of the iceberg of strategic planning is revealed. This is also evident from the 2017 law, which established the requirements for the defense strategy: NSO is the basis for the Secretary of Defense to develop annual directives to the leadership of the Pentagon and the Armed Forces for the preparation of budget projects, and once every two years - directives to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to develop and update plans use of aircraft. At the same time, the Secretary of Defense is obliged to provide the Armed Forces Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives with a detailed secret briefing revealing the main content of the directives related to the NSO.

Below we consider the main provisions of NSO-2022, taking into account the most significant installations of OYAP-2022 and OPRO-2022, a detailed review of which is beyond the scope of this work

In the context of NSO 2022, the key factors of the current moment are:

- strategic competition with China;
- acute threat from Russia;
- threats to US territory;
- the continuing threat from the DPRK, Iran and international terrorism.

NSO 2022 identifies China as the most serious challenge, pursuing a policy of “coersive” and “increasingly aggressive” transformation of the Indo-Pacific region (IPR) and the international system. Washington sees the Chinese threat on a global scale and everywhere in the IPR - in the Taiwan issue, in the South China and East China Seas and on the line of actual control with India. China is comprehensively developing various components of its national power. On the military front, China is taking a holistic approach and strengthening its presence beyond its borders, its power projection capabilities, and its nuclear capabilities.

One of the key ideas of NSO-2022 and NPR-2022 is that for the first time in history, the United States and its allies are faced with the need to simultaneously contain two major nuclear powers - Russia and China, which has a significant impact on strategic stability and American policy.

Unlike China, Russia does not, according to the United States, pose a long-term strategic threat

beyond the nuclear sphere. The threat from Russia is acute, but at the same time more limited in space and time. Russia is seeking to restore its “imperial zone of influence” and is expanding its “impressive track record” of “territorial aggressions.” NSO 2022 draws attention to the Russian-Chinese rapprochement and the risk that if America clashes with one of two key geopolitical adversaries, the other could take advantage of the situation and create a “strategic dilemma” for the United States.

Threats from the DPRK, Iran and international terrorism are noted, but the naked eye can see a decrease in attention to them compared to the topics of China and Russia. As for cross-border threats, which, in accordance with the NSS-2022, are one of the two strategic challenges to national security, they are mentioned purely formally, casually and in passing.

NSO 2022 increases the importance of the role of threats directly to American territory. And if during previous administrations, international terrorism and rogue countries like Iran and North Korea were mainly cited as sources of this threat, now it is Russia and China. There is a growing risk of the enemy's aggressive influence on the military-industrial complex, space facilities and other critical infrastructure, and ultimately on the will of the American public to pursue an active and independent foreign policy. The US strategic environment is becoming more dangerous and unstable. This is due to the emergence of new technologies, weapons systems and areas of confrontation. The interdependence of various spheres of military-political activity, the lack of developed norms of behavior and clear “red lines” entails increased risks of unintentional escalation.

The situation is aggravated by the desire of China, Russia and other adversaries to conduct “hostile activities” in the “gray zone,” that is, below the threshold of Washington’s use of military force, as well as indirect methods in border areas. This includes measures of economic pressure, the use of PMCs and puppet forces abroad, operations in the information and outer space, and military-technical cooperation. The Pentagon's priorities in accordance with NSO 2022 are:

- defense of the territory taking into account the growing threat from the PRC;
- deterring strategic attacks against the United States, its allies and partners;
- deterring aggression and ensuring readiness to prevail in an armed conflict, the first priority is the challenge from the PRC in the ITR, the second is the challenge from Russia in Europe;
- building sustainable aircraft and a “defense ecosystem”. NSO 2022 centers on two concepts: “integrated deterrence” and “campaigning.” At the level of strategic documents, doctrines and concepts in the United States, the invention of terms is very popular, including by creating new phrases or giving

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familiar terms other meanings. This is partly a consequence of political games and PR, attempts to attract the attention of the public and the press, to emphasize the difference between the leadership of a particular department and its predecessors through the use of buzzwords. But new terms cannot be discounted, since they often, even without being innovative concepts, accurately reflect the development of American military-political thought and the nuances of perception of the current situation.

Integrated deterrence is a response to a multi-domain threat from adversaries. "Integration" is built on the consistency of policies, investments and measures taken by the Pentagon with the aim of creating a coordinated deterrence system that takes into account the characteristics of a particular enemy, as well as the integration of conventional and nuclear deterrence, the tasks and capabilities of various American departments, allies and partners. In terms of "containment" itself, the important emphasis is not on the balance of power or potential, but on perception. The phrase that captures the essence of deterrence is worth quoting in its entirety due to its significance - "effective deterrence requires the Department of Defense to take into account how rivals perceive the objectives, the seriousness of the intentions and capabilities of the United States, its allies and partners, and their perception of their ability to control the risks of escalation, as well as their views on how the situation will change in the event of a renunciation of the use of force, including as a result of actions by the United States, its allies and partners." NSO-2022 identifies three types of deterrence depending on the nature of the impact on the enemy, his capabilities and perception, namely:

- Deterrence by preventing the enemy from achieving his goals or quickly gaining advantages. "We cannot implement our plans."

- Containment through resilience, that is, the ability to withstand damage and quickly recover from it. In particular, this concerns ensuring the sustainability of space and information infrastructure, which are a key condition for the effective actions of the Armed Forces. "We can carry out our plans, but the US will be able to quickly recover from the damage and strike back."

- Deterrence through the imposition of costs (cost imposition), when the benefits obtained as a result of hostile actions are offset by direct or indirect costs in the future. This category includes both sanctions and military assistance, as well as nuclear weapons. NSO 2022 emphasizes the importance of not only imposing costs directly by the United States itself, but also collectively. Thus, deterrence is enhanced by creating confidence in the adversary that his actions will face reactions not only from the United States itself, but also from its allies, including those who may not be directly affected by certain hostile

actions. "We can implement our plans, but the cost will be unacceptable."

NSO-2022 is quite vague, but still characterizes the features of the approach to containing China, Russia, North Korea and Iran, namely:

- China - independent actions of the United States to deter through prevention and resilience, developing new concepts and strengthening combat capability in the event of potential aggression from China.

- Russia – interaction with NATO to repel conventional aggression that can escalate into nuclear aggression of any scale.

- North Korea – reliance on its own external military presence and the potential for direct imposition of costs.

- Iran - relying on regional partners and strengthening their capabilities, identifying Iranian actions in the gray zone and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The idea of "conducting campaigns" in the context of NSO 2022 seems to be a more recent trend in military-political thought. Previously, military support for national security in peacetime was built primarily around external presence, combined with soft power, on the one hand, and power projection, on the other. But power projection is the act of direct use of military force, and therefore cannot be used against hostile great powers in peacetime. Previously, American policy was predominantly reactive, but retained elements of proactiveness towards friendly countries (military-technical cooperation, humanitarian assistance, military diplomacy and joint exercises) and obviously weaker states (Iraq, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan). The influence on potentially hostile great powers was realized mainly through political and diplomatic instruments in the opponent's zone of influence by influencing his geopolitical environment. Now, the United States is declaring that it will act proactively and more directly in peacetime against its geopolitical adversaries, taking military and non-military measures linked to strategy, taking into account the characteristics of the enemy, and united by a single design. The purpose of "campaigning" is to influence rivals to disrupt their activities that pose a threat to the security of the United States, its allies and partners, especially those carried out in the "gray zone." In fact, "conducting campaigns" is a symmetrical response to adversaries: you are conducting operations that affect our interests in the "gray zone" - we will not sit idly by, we will also conduct operations against you, including in the "gray zone".

"Campaigning" also aims not so much at the capabilities, infrastructure or forces of the enemy, but at its perception in order to sow doubts about the ability to achieve its goals or commit hostile acts with impunity. Possible tools used in "conducting campaigns" include information operations,



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intelligence activities and intelligence exchange with allies and partners, economic sanctions, etc.

Finally, in accordance with the guidelines of NSC 2022, NDS 2022 involves the involvement of allies and partners at all stages of military planning. The United States sees the development of the military and defense potential of its allies and partners as an important element in deterring adversaries. The United States reserves the global dimension of the geopolitical confrontation, but shifts a significant part of the burden and responsibility on a regional scale to its allies. For these purposes, it is planned to ease restrictions on the exchange of intelligence data, transfer and joint development of technologies, weapons and military equipment. NSO 2022 confirms some redistribution of the American external presence in favor of Europe and the IPR and at the expense of the Middle East. Within the framework of the idea of “integrated deterrence,” the United States sets the task of ensuring national security in the Western Hemisphere, the Arctic and Africa against the backdrop of concentrating key resources and attention on the industrial and technical infrastructure.

One of the key factors in the ITR is a very open attempt by NSO 2022 to highlight the contradictions between China and India and to introduce India as a key military partner of the United States into a broad anti-China coalition.

The second factor is that, against the backdrop of fierce competition with China in the ITR, the United States is shifting the emphasis of cooperation from a bilateral to a multilateral basis. There is no need to talk about the possibility of creating an analogue of NATO in the ITR, at least for now, but the United States is striving to bring together its allies that are quite distant from each other like Australia and Japan, to involve extra-regional powers (for example, Great Britain within the framework of AUKUS), and also to turn partners into allies (primarily this concerns India). Trying to isolate China as much as possible politically in the IPR, NSO 2022 declares the need to transform ASEAN into a platform for solving regional security problems. NSO 2022 points to the need to reallocate attention and resources to priority threats and recognize increased risks in other areas. The concentration of national power on the great powers implies a reduction in the number of functions performed by the armed forces on a daily basis, due to the development of the functionality of deterrence and preparation for war, rather than the non-military potential of providing humanitarian assistance, soft power and military diplomacy. The United States fears that in the event of a clash with one of its geopolitical opponents, the second may make an adventurous attempt to take advantage of the situation and carry out “aggressive actions” in another region, which is a risk, given the abandonment of the “two major regional wars” standard. The Americans adhered to this standard after the end of the Cold War,

and under George W. Bush adopted an even more ambitious concept of “1-4-2-1”, according to which the armed forces must be able to simultaneously effectively defend their own territory and contain conflicts in four regions and wage two major regional wars, in one of which victory must be achieved as quickly as possible. As the limits of American military power, budgetary constraints and the growth of the military potential of Russia and China were realized, this standard was revised, which was enshrined in the Strategic Defense Guidance of the Barack Obama administration back in 2012, and later confirmed in the latest Quadrennial Defense Policy Review of 2014 and NSO 2018 of the Donald Trump administration. NSO 2022 retains Trump’s formulation – to ensure victory in one conflict with a major power and deter “opportunistic aggression” in another region. At the same time, the Joint Nuclear Program 2022 directly states that one of the important elements of deterring “opportunistic aggression” will be nuclear weapons. At the same time, it is noted that a conflict with China and Russia simultaneously is extremely unlikely.

NSO 2022 points to the need to prepare for low-intensity conflicts and military operations limited in time and scale, but so that this does not significantly affect the readiness to conduct high-intensity combat operations in a full-scale conflict. It further explicitly states that day-to-day requirements for external presence and combat alert should not negatively impact combat readiness for future missions. This could likely accelerate the gradual limitation of the external naval presence of the United States, the increasing intensity of which, coupled with a reduction in the number of naval personnel, has led over 20 years to a significant increase in the operational load on the fleet forces. In the context of building a sustainable armed forces and “defense ecosystem,” special emphasis is placed on the development of reconnaissance, communications and control systems, including space ones. The ultimate goal is to increase the stability of the overall intelligence, communications and control system, the quality and speed of target detection and target designation, as well as the ability to effectively threaten key elements of the enemy’s military power, primarily those that provide him with the ability to limit access in relation to the US Armed Forces (anti-access/area-denial capability, or A2/AD, is another “fashionable” concept, the popularity of which has decreased somewhat in recent years, which did not prevent it from being included in NSO-2022). This concerns, first of all, air defense systems, as well as various carriers of high-precision weapons based on land, air and sea. It is emphasized that threatening an adversary’s A2/AD capability must be accompanied by escalation management. NSO-2022 makes quite loud statements regarding the existing military development system. Currently, it is too slow and focused on creating systems that are not designed to

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counter the most serious challenges of the future. The Pentagon should emphasize the rapid development of new technologies and concepts, accelerating the development and adoption of new weapons systems, which should have an open architecture and be adapted to introduce new technologies. The United States plans to create an “innovation ecosystem” within the defense industrial complex, which also includes joint projects with allies and partners. Mutually beneficial military-technical cooperation between the United States and key countries in the joint development of new weapons systems and the introduction of new technologies is expected to be provided with comprehensive support. The Pentagon plans to actively adopt the achievements of the civilian commercial sector that are relevant to the Armed Forces in terms of introducing artificial intelligence technologies, microelectronics, renewable energy, etc. along with its own developments in hypersonic weapons, directed energy weapons, information technology, biotechnology, advanced materials and quantum information science. It is also planned to carry out institutional reforms and ensure integration in relation to programs for the accumulation and processing of data, the creation of specialized software and the introduction of artificial intelligence technologies. The Pentagon will support the development of modern production technologies in the defense industrial complex. Particular attention is paid to the development of human resources of the Ministry of Defense, the Armed Forces and the military-industrial complex. The importance of new specialties in the field of advanced information technology and artificial intelligence, as well as interaction with educational institutions, including civilian ones, is emphasized. It is necessary to develop internal competencies and understanding among Ministry of Defense employees and military personnel of advanced technologies, potential adversaries and the future shape of military conflicts. Strengthening the role of language training, critical thinking and analytical skills, social and behavioral sciences in the educational programs of military universities is becoming important. The Pentagon plans to develop a system of internships, fellowships and professional development for Department employees, including in the private sector, to increase awareness, develop expertise and competencies and attract best practices. It seems advisable to study this Pentagon experience and use it in domestic practice.

One gets the impression that the United States fears a repeat of something similar to the attack on Pearl Harbor. There are parallels between NSO 2022's warnings about “cost imposition” and “sustainability” and the phrase attributed to Admiral Yamamoto (indeed a graceful piece of American cinema), “we have awakened a sleeping giant.” The attention and language regarding the island of Guam is indicative: any attack on it or any other territory of the United

States will be considered a direct attack. It's a curious coincidence that during the Pacific War, Hawaii, like Guam now, was a territory, not a state. The United States intends to remain the leader of the “free world”, establish international rules and prevent any attempts by “anti-democratic forces” to challenge their position. At the same time, they fear the sliding of rivalry into war, uncontrolled escalation and hostile actions of their opponents, especially large-scale and preventive ones. The Pentagon plans to avoid inadvertently slipping from competition to confrontation, and to complement enhanced deterrence by managing the risks of escalation. It is indicative to include the topic “Risk Management” as an independent section, as well as the introduction of a subsection on escalation management to the section on integrated deterrence. One of the terms that NSO-2022 characterizes the current strategic situation and processes occurring in the military-political sphere is “opacity.” It is interesting to draw a parallel with the term “uncertainty,” which became popular in American military-political strategy after the end of the bipolar confrontation. And if by “uncertainty” we meant, first of all, the inability to clearly predict the results of the development of current processes, then by “opacity” we mean the unpredictability of the mechanisms and processes themselves that influence the emergence of conflicts and escalation, the vagueness of critical thresholds and “red lines”, distortion and inaccuracy perception during contacts and transmission of information. NSO 2022 emphasizes the importance of communication and consultation in crisis situations, not only with allies and partners, but also with adversaries. Considerable attention is paid to risk management and the prevention of incorrect assessments and decisions in the 2022 Nuclear Program. The role of communications is noted to prevent misperceptions of policies, capabilities and intentions by adversaries and adversaries by the United States itself. It also states that Americans must carefully avoid crossing misunderstood or vague “red lines” that constitute the threshold for enemy use of nuclear weapons. Measures to manage these risks should include both internal research, scenario analysis and assessment, and active engagement with potential adversaries through a wide range of public and private dialogue mechanisms in peacetime and in times of crisis or conflict. The United States says it is committed to increasing transparency and mutual understanding.

### Main part

The new version of the Foreign Policy Concept, approved on March 31, 2023 by Vladimir Putin, dramatically changes previous ideas about the role and place of Russia in the world. Regardless of the constructiveness or debatability of the various novelties of the document, it must be recognized that their implementation will take place in a world

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radically different from the provisions contained in the Concept. Practice significantly lags behind theory, and this, apparently, will be worse for practice. A single continental space of peace, stability, mutual trust, development and prosperity. Russia as a distinctive state-civilization and one of the leading centers of development of the modern world. International use of the Northern Sea Route against the backdrop of a non-equilibrium model of global development that is irreversibly becoming a thing of the past. Anglo-Saxon states, abusing either their dominant position or its rudiments. The collective West, limiting the sovereignty of the states that are part of its collective. Dissemination of truthful information about a new type of war against the background of destructive information and psychological influence. A common problem with the latest versions of the Foreign Policy Concept (CFP) of the Russian Federation, provisions from the new edition of which are given above, was the lag between the written normative letter and the tirelessly changing reality. For example, the 2013 CVP, which stated “priority” relations with the states of the Euro-Atlantic region, based on “deep common civilizational roots,” already a year later began to look so extravagant that it had to be practically ignored in the conduct of foreign policy. Despite all the internal political somersaults and maneuvers towards either “sovereign democracy” or national patriotism, from 2008 to March 31, 2023, Russia emphasized its commitment to “universal democratic values”, which at the same time were the object of criticism not so much from the opposition, as much as the country's leadership itself. In short, in the past, the “system of views on the national interests of the Russian Federation in the foreign policy sphere,” which is what the Foreign Policy Concept should be, was considerably behind the times. In the case of the 2023 edition, we are seeing a completely different type of understanding of reality. Now the conjuncture not only cannot overtake, but even, it seems, cannot catch up with the flight of conceptual thought. Of course, in any doctrine, concept or strategy there is an artistic element - these are, if you like, the laws of the genre. A description of the future, even if it is the nearest one, is never complete without visionary vision and bold forecasts (often, however, they miss the mark, no matter how much the authors would like the opposite). However, the new Foreign Policy Concept addresses such goals, objectives and directions that it is difficult to imagine their implementation in the long term, not only over the six-year interval traditional for strategic planning documents, but also over a much longer (perhaps even multiple) period of time. In this world, not only has the problem of sustainable development of the Russian economy on a new technological basis been successfully solved, but also the model of global development that has existed for centuries (as indicated in the Concept itself) has fallen. Artificial

intelligence and the latest technologies mysteriously strengthen national identity and “universal and traditional spiritual and moral values.” The new, multipolar system of international relations is based on “restoring the role of the UN as a central coordinating mechanism in coordinating the interests of states,” although the UN itself represents the core element of the Yalta-Potsdam system. The latter, firstly, cannot be called something new, and secondly, it has been drawing criticism for several decades from the powers that, claiming the role of “many poles”, do not have the opportunity to stand on the same level as the permanent members of the Council Security. The CVP proclaims strengthening the potential and increasing the international role of the CSTO - against the background, to put it mildly, of controversial processes in this organization and a number of member countries in recent years. The concept returns to the Greater Eurasian Partnership project, first proclaimed in 2015, but which has made little progress since then in terms of practical implementation. And so on for a number of key points, right down to the principles of a multipolar system of international relations - when reading them, only the last lines of Pushkin's “Confession” come to mind. The central point of the new Concept was a truly quantum leap in the use of a civilizational approach. Some of its inclusions have been found in the CVP before - for example, in the context of “diversity of civilizations” or even “between civilizational fault lines”, but never before has Russia been directly declared at the same time as a “distinctive state-civilization”, “a vast Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power” and “a sovereign center of world development with a unique mission and a creative civilizational role.” The term “mission” did not appear at all in previous versions of the KVP, like any other synonyms for purpose, destiny or calling. Attentive readers may correct: since 2013, the text of the Concept began emphasizing the country's “unique role” “as a balancing factor in international affairs and the development of world civilization,” and this was indeed a significant increase in the stakes compared to previous diplomatic statements about “a constructive role in ensuring the civilizational compatibility of Europe” (KVP 2008) or “a constructive role in solving pressing international problems” (KVP 2000). Now, in addition to the state, culture and “community of the Russian world,” the ties of the Russian people with the peoples of the CIS member states have also become “civilizational” (which, however, do not prescribe similar provisions in their conceptual documents concerning foreign policy activities). It is striking that in the text of the KVP, besides the Russian one, only one civilization is mentioned - Islamic. Not Chinese, not Indian, not Arab, and not even Western or Anglo-Saxon - although (to the shudder of medievalists and lovers of the real Heptarchy) the mysterious “Anglo-Saxon states” are spelled out for the first time in Russian



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official documents. Such a silence, unfortunately, is typical for civilizational searches: it is no wonder to proclaim oneself a civilization, but it is much more difficult to understand exactly what a world ordered in this way looks like and what specific civilizations it includes. A few decades ago, sociologists Tajfel and Turner noted that the first step in building identity is categorization - a kind of ordering of the surrounding world, dividing it into groups, forming "order and coherence [...] when alternative guidelines for action are absent, unclear or confused." When the civilizational approach is chosen as the basis for such categorization within foreign policy, it is precisely this path that becomes unclear and confusing - while alternative options like "nation-states" and "state-nations" are characterized by precisely yet greater elaboration, prevalence and detail. That is why it is characteristic that, with all the homage to civilizationism, the new KVP with much greater regularity turns to the familiar "national" language: both in the context of "national" (and not at all "civilizational") interests, and in the context of "national" priorities, the same features, the same security and economy. Attempts to unite "nation" and "civilization" in one galley, of course, have been made before (suffice it to remember that the National Policy Strategy until 2025 postulated the presence of a "single cultural (civilization) code"), but it is characteristic that today within content-related documents - such as the CVP, the National Security Strategy or the now widely mentioned Presidential Decree No. 809 - civilizational images are either widely presented (as in the Concept), or not mentioned at all (as in the last-mentioned documents). The Strategy of State Cultural Policy speaks of "traditional values and norms for Russian civilization"; at the same time, official discourse at least as often refers to the concept of a "national cultural code." Just as the constitutional amendments of 2020 gave lawyers the mystery of connecting two peoples - the "multinational" and the "forming state", the new KVP is trying to conduct Russian foreign policy between the "national" and "civilizational" pillars of Hercules, beyond which, of course, one can see an inevitably bright future. An even more significant circumstance complicating the assessment of the new Concept is that it sharply revises a number of provisions that were reflected in most previous versions of the document. Some changes can be explained by the turbulence of international relations (remembering, however, that that an attempt to set a new strategic vector at a time of turbulence is an interesting activity, but hardly fruitful), but others cause bewilderment with their declarative nature. An example of the latter is the deliberate shift of Europe and the United States in the list of regional foreign policy directions: never in the history of the Russian Federation has interaction with such states been lower than the Arctic, ASEAN, Africa and the Caribbean. The demonstrative

demotion of countries that, whether we like it or not, plays a very significant role on the world stage and are still Russia's leading economic partners looks deliberate. Even in 2022, against the backdrop of all the sanctions and severance of ties, the volume of foreign trade transactions with the United States amounted to more than 16 billion dollars - seemingly less than two percent of the total volume of foreign trade, but still more than trade turnover with India (13.5 billion dollars), and slightly less than with all (!) African countries (18 billion dollars). The scale of interactions with the EU is even more impressive - at the end of 2022, it not only did not decrease, but also reached its maximum in the last 8 years, amounting to 258.6 billion euros (which is much more than, for example, trade turnover with China). At the same time, the same relations are described for the first time through the formulas of "Western hegemony", "Russophobia" and "aggressive anti-Russian policy of the collective West". To be fair, we note that 2022, extraordinary in every sense, can hardly be considered as determining the future; the structure of Russia's economic ties is changing radically. But even in these circumstances, recognizing the "collective West" as an insignificant counterparty at the very bottom of the hierarchy of priorities can only be done for emotional and propaganda reasons. In the end, the fierce confrontation with it, which is actually recognized in the text, does not allow insufficient attention to be paid to this area. In at least two previous versions of the Russian Foreign Policy Concept - 2008 and 2013. - Russia, despite the earlier Munich speech and the conflict in South Ossetia, was confidently called "the largest European state" and "an integral, organic part of European civilization," respectively. Moreover, even in the KVP-2016, adopted two and a half years after the inclusion of Crimea into Russia, there were formulas about "building an equal and indivisible system of pan-European security" or "forming a common economic and humanitarian space from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean based on harmonization and connecting the processes of European and Eurasian integration." Now we are talking about "the transformation of Eurasia into a single common continental space <...> Greater Eurasian Partnership" and, at best, "lasting peace in the European part of Eurasia." The change in civilizational affiliation, or rather, now in the originality of Russia, seems to be of interest, but a debatable step - if circumstances are capable of so rapidly influencing civilizational identity, the question arises as to how applicable such a lexicon is generally applicable. If in the KVP 2013 and 2016. While it was about the important or priority "importance of the implementation of the Treaty <...> on measures for the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons," the new version of the document only speaks of "the destruction of the system of treaties in the field of arms control," undermining strategic stability. If earlier (in 2008,



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2013 and 2016) one of the main barriers to the development of contacts between Russia and the EU was called the “visa regime”, the abolition of which was called “a powerful impulse for strengthening cooperation”, now only a very vague “formation of a new model of coexistence with European states.” But there was a postulation of “a comprehensive deepening of ties and coordination with friendly sovereign global centers <...> committed to approaches that fundamentally coincide with Russian approaches to the future world order.” The rhetoric of various “centers of world development” permeates the entire Concept - Russia and the USA are directly named as such, China and India are indirectly designated, and also, as if in addition to the proclamation of “Islamic civilization,” it is not the country that is called the “original and influential center of world development” the entire African continent. Thus, the document proclaiming the value of “renouncing neocolonial ambitions” reproduces a rather specific discourse, the inadmissibility of which has been warned by many authors, including Dipo Faloyin, who last year published a bestseller with the characteristic title “Africa is Not a Country.” Finally, it is noteworthy that precisely in 2023, against the backdrop of a military operation lasting more than a year, the KVP for the first time in the history of the Russian Federation includes provisions on the “peacefulness” of foreign policy - in previous versions of the Concept such a word was used only in relation to Afghanistan, or rather, in relation to what a restored Afghanistan should become. In conclusion, however, it is worth repeating - the most fascinating feature of the new Foreign Policy Concept is not an attempt to combine the incompatible and not another sharp change in priorities and guidelines, seemingly recently declared “traditional”. The main mystery of the KVP lies in the very possibility of its “grounding”, that is, implementation within the framework of the existing system of international relations, the current situation and, finally, the existing capabilities of the intended performers. To proclaim, as you know, is one thing, but to introduce and implement is completely different. How, in the conditions of sanctions and international contacts shrinking like shagreen leather, can we form a technological basis for effective economic recovery? It’s hardly worth talking about growth seriously - since 2014, the physical volume of Russian GDP has increased by only 6.3%, while the global figure is about 26.3 percent. How to quickly reorient the training of diplomatic personnel to work not even in Delhi or Beijing, but in Asmara or Bamako? How to convert statistical calculations that are convincing to the average person in the spirit of “a third of the world lives in neutral countries leaning toward Russia” into the effective formation of a new world, when even the USSR, according to sociologists, failed to “leave the orbit of the capitalist world system”? How to restore the role of the UN as

the central coordinating mechanism of international relations, when any vote in the Security Council faces another veto, and the position of the General Assembly forces Russian experts to count on their heads those who abstained or were absent? In Ukraine - opened a new period of Russian history. February 24, 2022 - the beginning of a special military operation and became a turning point in modern international politics. Russia's relations with the West, which had steadily deteriorated over the previous decade, have finally collapsed. In response to actions in Ukraine, the West threatens to turn Russia into an international pariah, consistently blocks its foreign economic relations, and tries to influence Russian society by isolating it from the outside world.

Against the backdrop of the consolidation of the West around the United States, a rapprochement between Russia and China is taking place. Coalitions of great powers are being formed in the world, opposing each other on the most important issues of world order and fundamental values. Globalization is being replaced by regionalization, the world is splitting into opposing military-political, financial-economic and technological blocs. Politics dominates economics. The well-known formula of thirty years ago is turned inside out: It's geopolitics, stupid! In this virtually warlike situation, a “re-issue” of the Russian Federation is inevitable. The main direction of the government's measures is the mobilization of all available resources and the maximum expansion of economic freedoms within the country while simultaneously supporting socially vulnerable segments of the population. But these are only the first urgent measures. The country needs fundamental changes: closing the channels that feed corruption; reorientation of big business towards national interests; a new personnel policy with the aim of significantly improving the quality of public administration at all levels; social solidarity; the return of fundamental - not monetary - values as the basis of life. These changes, in turn, are impossible without overcoming the remaining elements of offshore oligarchic capitalism, widespread rotation and improvement of the ruling elite, state and administrative apparatuses and, as a consequence, re-concluding a social contract between the government and society on the basis of mutual trust and solidarity. The most important front of confrontation takes place within Russian society. You can cope with an external challenge only under the condition of self-purification and self-determination. It is necessary to defeat not only theft and embezzlement, but also cynicism, primitive materialism, and lack of faith; become citizens in the full sense of the word; decide for what a person lives and the country exists - and without what, if you expand this thesis, life and existence become meaningless; stop lying to others and to yourself. Hopes for such a turn arose during the “Russian Spring” of 2014, but they were not realized,

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which gave rise to disappointment. Now there is a second chance. We must learn the lesson of history: the Russian state is practically invincible from the outside, but it collapses to its core when a significant mass of Russian people become disillusioned with their rulers and the existing unjust or dysfunctional social system. In Russian foreign policy, there has been a transition from the confrontation (confrontation) with the collective West that began in 2014 to an active hybrid war with it. A hybrid war is an acute confrontation, including armed conflicts (so far indirect) of varying degrees of intensity, with the exception of a general nuclear war; economic, financial and technological blockade; information war; cyber attacks; terrorism; subversion and so on. Hybrid war is not a “second cold war”, since the Russian Federation is not the Soviet Union, and the rest of the world has changed a lot over the past decades. But, like the Cold War, hybrid confrontation is an acute form of struggle for a new world order. This time we are talking about maintaining the global dominance of the West, led by the United States, or the formation of a polycentric system of relations without the real dominance of any one force in it. The transition from confrontation to hybrid war means that the time for maneuvers and attempts to persuade “partners” and “colleagues” is over; the viscous confrontation with them has been replaced by an acute confrontation. The deterioration of relations over the past two decades has moved beyond the so-called values gap in the 2000s. To a trust deficit in the 2010s and open hostility in the early 2020s. The United States and its allies are no longer opponents, but adversaries of Russia. The West is breaking ties with Russia - both with the state and with society - in all areas. This gap will last for a long time. The West will not “understand”, will not “soften” and will not “become kinder” to Russia. For Western countries, Russia, labeled a threat and declared an international pariah, has become the most important factor in internal consolidation around the United States, and as such it is indispensable for the foreseeable future. In any case, returning relations between the Russian Federation and the West to the past is clearly impossible. The goals of the opposing sides are the most decisive. For the West, led by Washington, the main goal is not just a change in the political regime in Russia, but also the elimination of Russia as a major independent entity on the world stage, ideally, closing it on internal conflicts and contradictions. For Russia, the main goal is to establish the country as a self-sufficient and independent great power from the West in economic, financial and technological terms, one of the centers and leaders of the emerging new polycentric world order. These goals leave no room for strategic compromise. Objectively, many of Russia’s goals coincide with the aspirations of a number of non-Western states – not only China, but partly India, and other members of the BRICS group.

At the same time, the global “non-West,” unlike the West, is not a coalition united by common interests and values. The interests of different countries in this part of the world system vary greatly, the contradictions between them - for example, between India and China, India and Pakistan, Iran and Arab countries - are strong and lead to conflicts. Even more important is that, unlike Russia (and Iran), the rest of the leading countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America remain deeply integrated into the American-centric financial and economic system, and many are politically and ideologically dependent on the United States. In these conditions, Russia should not count on significant help and support from non-Western partners - their actual neutrality, that is, non-participation in anti-Russian sanctions, will be enough. Russia will mainly have to rely on its own strength. However, Russia’s relations with the two largest powers in Asia - China and India - are of the utmost strategic importance. The rise of the PRC naturally led to its confrontation with the United States, which is seeking to maintain, if not dominance, then primacy in the world system. At the same time, thanks to the progressive development of Russian-Chinese relations over the past three decades, the quality of the partnership between Moscow and Beijing has become unprecedentedly high. The acute confrontation between the United States and Russia, as well as the worsening confrontation between America and China, objectively lead to a new type of alliance - “without borders”, but also without strict obligations - between Russia and China. In the context of an economic war with the West, Beijing is Moscow’s most important partner in the fields of finance, technology, and economics for the foreseeable future. The guarantee of this partnership on the Chinese side is the strategic national interest of China itself.

Russia’s relations with India are based on long-standing traditions of friendship and mutual sympathy. The growing importance and role of India in the world is in Russia’s interests. The increase in India’s economic power and its technological development expand the potential for interaction with Russia. At the same time, the contradictions between Delhi and Beijing, as well as the political and economic rapprochement of India with the United States against the backdrop of a hybrid war between the United States and Russia and increasingly close cooperation between the Russian Federation and the PRC pose a serious challenge to Russian-Indian relations. An urgent task is to strengthen the strategic partnership between Moscow and Delhi in order to bring it to the level of Russian-Chinese interaction. At a time when politics begins to dominate economics, an important task of Russian foreign policy is to help mitigate Indian-Chinese differences and involve India in closer strategic interaction both on a bilateral basis and on the RIC, SCO and BRICS platforms. Most

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international organizations in which Russia participates are dominated by the United States and/or its allies. Typical examples are the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Council of Europe. The withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the Council of Europe is a long overdue step. Even the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was founded by the Soviet Union, is under the decisive influence of Western countries. The exception is the United Nations, where Russia, as a permanent member of the Security Council, has the right of veto. For Moscow, which takes an active position in the UN and its institutions, it makes sense to focus much more on organizations of non-Western countries - BRICS, SCO, RIC, as well as on organizations in which Russia plays a leading role - the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. At all these platforms, it is necessary to develop and promote the global agenda, the contours of which were set out in the joint Russian-Chinese statement of February 4, 2022. These theses must be turned into a global platform for interaction between interested states. The primary tasks of the Russian foreign policy in the new conditions seem quite obvious: (a) strategic containment of the enemy - the United States and its NATO allies, prevention, despite the active hybrid confrontation with them, slide towards nuclear war; (b) creating favorable conditions for Russia's self-development, relying primarily on internal resources and maintaining/reorienting its foreign economic relations during the outbreak of the economic war with the West; maximum assistance to Russian business within the country and in foreign economic activity; (c) development of close coordination and interaction with the main ally of the Russian Federation - Belarus; development of economic integration and strengthening of military cooperation with the countries of the EAEU and CSTO; (d) further expansion of areas of practical interaction and strengthening of mutual understanding with the main strategic partners of the Russian Federation - China and India; (e) active development of ties with Turkey, Iran, and other countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa that have not joined the sanctions regime against Russia; (e) gradual formation, together with partners in the SCO and BRICS, and other interested states, of the foundations of a new international financial architecture that does not depend on the US dollar. The conditions of a hybrid war do not leave much room for cooperation with unfriendly states - Russia's actual opponents. However, it is worth maintaining, as much as possible, a situation of strategic stability with the United States and preventing dangerous military incidents with the United States and NATO countries. This requires reliable functioning of communication channels with American and NATO authorities responsible for defense and security. In solving other global problems

- such as climate change, combating epidemics or preserving nature in the Arctic - emphasis will have to be placed on national programs and cooperation with friendly states.

In the Ukrainian direction, the task of Russian foreign policy after the end of the military conflict is the formation of new relations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, reliably excluding the transformation of Ukraine into a threat to the security of Russia; recognition by Kiev of the status of Crimea as part of the Russian Federation and the independence of the Donbass republics. A promising goal is the formation of a new geopolitical reality (community) in eastern Europe based on friendly relations between Russia, Belarus, the Donbass republics, as well as relations with Ukraine acceptable to the Russian Federation. In the context of a sharp reduction in contacts with Western countries (North America, Europe, the Anglosphere), it is necessary to redistribute Russia's foreign diplomatic resources from the West to the East and South, starting with the neighboring CIS countries, where diplomatic activity and the effectiveness of Russia's foreign policy are clearly insufficient. It's time to start strengthening the expert and analytical base of Russian foreign policy, especially in the countries of the former Soviet Union, as well as Russia's neighbors in Eurasia. Many failures, miscalculations and failures of Moscow's foreign policy in the Ukrainian direction since the 1990s. are rooted in shallow, top-level ideas about the political, social and ideological realities of modern Ukraine. To correct the situation, it is necessary to create world-class centers to study the processes occurring in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Kazakhstan, as well as in the Transcaucasus. Along with this, it is necessary to shift the focus of foreign policy information and propaganda from Western countries, where a strong anti-Russian consensus has been formed in societies, to non-Western countries, the development of meaningful, respectful dialogues, first of all, with the societies of states that have taken a neutral position in the global hybrid war. This applies primarily to the leading countries of Asia, Latin America and Africa (China, India, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Nigeria, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Algeria). In addition to information and propaganda resources, Russian research centers focusing on these regions should receive incentive support. With the change in the situation, the need to formulate a new guiding idea for Russian foreign policy in the 21st century has become even more obvious - primarily for the Russian Federation itself, its close friends and for the outside world: neutrals and situational allies. Pragmatism as a strategy is no longer acceptable in current conditions; he descends to the level of tactics. We need a modern-sounding "Russian idea", based on a set of values that are organic to the people of Russia, and including a number of goals and

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principles: sovereignty of states; indivisibility of international security; justice based on law; co-development; maintaining cultural diversity; dialogue of civilizations. The main task in the ideological direction is the implementation of the stated values and goals in the practical policy of the Russian state within the country, as well as on the international stage.

### Conclusion

In general, the American expert community greeted NSO2022 positively. A number of experts have expressed concerns about how the administration and the Pentagon will turn the conceptual guidelines of NSO 2022 into concrete decisions and activities. Doubts were also voiced about the advisability of increasing the degree of tension towards China. Finally, a number of experts, having read the NSO-2022, drew attention not to the description of the ominous pre-war period, the global ideological confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism and the coming tripolar nuclear world, but to the insufficient, in their opinion, attention paid to human rights, the fight against climate change and peace and security issues with a gender perspective. At the same time, the Biden administration's strategic documents are increasingly reminiscent of the famous cartoon by British artist Tom Gold, "Our Sacred Land is Their Barbarian Desert." Their multi-domain threats are our integrated deterrence, their malign behavior and gray zone violence is our "campaigning", their proliferation of advanced military technologies is our military-technical cooperation, their nuclear threats are our deterrent signals. NSO-2022 and NSC-2022 do not in any way try to provide a logical, rational justification for the policies of opponents, be it China, Russia or Iran, from the point of view of the national interests of these countries, to find common ground and opportunities for a diplomatic settlement based on negotiations and compromises. It is impossible not to notice in the text of NSO-2022 obvious pairs with the same content and polar values.

Thus, the following quote from NSO 2022 stands out: "U.S. leadership in defining norms of behavior in the information, space, and other emerging technological domains will strengthen deterrence by strengthening international consensus on what constitutes malign and aggressive behavior." The United States once again emphasizes that it is they who must determine "what is good and what is bad" in the international arena, and the tired "rules-based order" implies rules defined by Washington and consistent with its interests. Even Western experts note that the "rules-based order" represents the globalization of the liberal world order, the international ideology of the Western bloc, which won the Cold War, but is not the only or optimal vector of development for all of humanity.

In general, the Biden administration, in terms of strategic documents, is trying to avoid swings in extreme directions such as Trump's shocking quasi-isolationism or the straightforward unilateralism of George W. Bush. NSO-2022, like NSS2022, lies within the framework of traditional guidelines and is an evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, development of the American military-political strategy. One should not exaggerate the differences with the NSO 2018 guidelines of the Donald Trump administration.

The world within which the Pentagon plans to ensure national interests and security has definitely become darker and more alarming. The coming years will be a time of further development of the ideological and military-political confrontation between the "enlightened free world" and the "barbarian revisionists." What gives some hope is that Washington appears to be well aware of the potentially catastrophic consequences of uncontrolled escalation and is interested in avoiding it. However, there is no doubt that the risk of a major war will not stop the United States in the struggle for dominance in the world; Washington will simply try to achieve its goals with minimal risks and costs for itself.

The new Foreign Policy Concept has at least three fundamental vulnerabilities that prevent its unambiguous approval as a strategic guideline for relevant activities.

Firstly, the very system of views it sets is characterized by both courage and not always appropriate visionariness - after all, there are problems in the world that are difficult to solve (if at all) through a normative announcement that a solution has been found. Neither the crusade against neocolonialism, nor new civilizational alignments, nor the postulation of a special mission will acquire political meaning until they are understood, supported and appropriated by the overwhelming majority of the population - at the same time, recent practice shows that even with an unambiguous explanation and legitimation where To put it mildly, domestic information machines sometimes have problems with smaller-scale events and processes.

Secondly, the aforementioned visionaryism and the formation of "pleasant flexibility" in the foreign policy body may turn into an elementary blunder, in which Russia will once again decisively move in one direction, and the centers of global development and geopolitical influence that are valuable to it will move in a slightly different direction. It was said above that strategic restructuring in a period of turbulence is a task that threatens to turn into Sisyphean; it is only worth emphasizing that any mistake of this kind can weigh somewhat more than a routine wrong turn. For some literary heroes, I remember, it was valuable to hit a target invisible to the eye, because "anyone can hit an open object," but foreign policy in the spirit of Bulgakov's Koroviev is a thought experiment



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ICV (Poland) = 6.630  
PIF (India) = 1.940  
IBI (India) = 4.260  
OAJI (USA) = 0.350

undesirable for a nuclear power faced with “the abuse of individual states of their dominant position in some areas.” Finally, the third and perhaps the most important question is whose hands will pave the way for the implementation of all the impressive provisions of the KVP, because for a number of Russian officials, not excluding the most status ones, the current Concept is the fifth (!) in a series of those that they found in his position. Moreover, the same figures are contemporaries and witnesses not only to the next change in “basic principles” and “strategic goals”, but also to the persistent inequality in the country, the degradation of the culture of dialogue, as

well as the stubbornly reproducing behavior of their own elites in the spirit of the denounced “neoliberal” installations. The very spirit of the new Foreign Policy Concept suggests that the formation of a fair world order and new models of economic development is something more than replacing direct technological dependence with “parallel imports”, and German-made luxury cars with Chinese analogues produced by Hongqi. It is unclear, however, how this spirit will be matched by those who, over the course of decades, have created with their own hands something exactly the opposite.

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