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ON THE FEATURES OF RUSSIA'S NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY

Abstract: In the article, the authors explored the origins of this phenomenon, which is usually sought in local specifics, in cultural practices described by anthropologists and ethnographers. This study is an attempt to demonstrate that the language of neotribalism is modern, it appeared in response to current demands, and the state plays one of the main roles in its formation and maintenance. A study of the new development policy of the Far East was conducted according to the criteria of compliance with the model of a developing state (developmental state) and an explanation of the identified deviations was proposed. It is shown that the transformation of goals in Far Eastern policy, the expansion of its spatial and content coverage, as well as the growth of the simulation component, are largely caused by the multitasking and structural weakness of the Ministry of the Russian Federation for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic, its struggle to maintain positions among other ministries and departments. The research is based on open sources, archival documents and a series of anonymous semi-structured interviews with representatives of government bodies, municipalities, employees of development institutions and resident entrepreneurs of territories of rapid socio-economic development.

Key words: regional development, state, Far East, priority development territories, Far Eastern politics, bureaucracy, development institutions.

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Introduction

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Far Eastern policy, at least at the level of declarations and formal structures, is taking on an

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innovative character; it is designed to transform the style and content of public administration and create an effective bureaucracy aimed at economic results. The Far East is a field of experimentation with the prospect of spreading successful practices throughout the country. In political terms, Far Eastern politics is acquiring the features of a mass movement (about the similarity of the leader of a development state with the leader of a mass movement. It is personalized, almost a personal project of the president, who in his Address to the Federal Assembly in 2013 declared the rise of the eastern territories a national priority for the entire 21st century. This thesis, along with a photograph of V.V. Putin, is posted on the main page of the website of the Ministry of the Russian Federation for the Development of the Far East and Arctic. In June 2020, the President signed a special decree on the development of the region. The recently approved development program, the only one of all regional programs, has "national" status and was formed with the participation of residents of the Far East. The preamble of this document notes that 230 thousand Russian citizens took part in its formation. Official news content related to the Far East is filled with information about completed and promising projects opening in region opportunities.

Meanwhile, objective data show a contradictory picture. Despite the increase in the number of residents of the territories of advanced socio-economic development (hereinafter referred to as ASEZ/ASED) and the Free Port of Vladivostok (hereinafter referred to as FPV), the economic dynamics here differ slightly from the all-Russian one, and often look even worse. In terms of the share of investments in the country's total, the Far East occupies its usual penultimate place, ahead only of the North Caucasus, and has still not reached the level of 2012, when large-scale construction projects for the APEC summit were completed in the region. The region's share of foreign direct investment in the country as a whole was growing, but this was happening against the backdrop of a dramatic drop in their overall flow to Russia. The growth of exports from the Far East (one of the main priorities of the new policy), according to the Ministry of Eastern Development, amounted to \$11.3 billion in the first half of 2020 (7% of the country's exports). However, simple calculations leave no reason for pride here either: at the end of 2012, exports of goods from the Far East amounted to almost \$27 billion. From 2002 to 2012, this figure doubled every five years.

The experience of special regional development structures is contradictory not only in Russia, but also in the world. Many of them would fit the assessment given by the Brazilian Agency for the Development of the North-East: "It is not that the actions [...] were useless. <...> The crisis would have been even more serious without him." It is hardly a coincidence that our interlocutor, who is involved in the problems of

the Far East, assesses the effectiveness of the management of this region in the same way:

"Politics is still being pursued, a new policy. If she hadn't been there, it would have been even worse."

Without the Ministry of Eastern Development, as well as the corporations and agencies subordinate to it, it would probably have been worse, but they still have not formed into a system that ensures accelerated growth. Why? This is the main question this article aims to answer.

The analysis of the problem formulated above will be carried out through the sequential solution of three problems, namely:

first, we will determine the degree to which Far Eastern policy meets the criteria of a developing state and identify observed deviations from them;

secondly, we reconstruct the logic of transformation of goals and increasing imitation of results in Far Eastern policy;

thirdly, to complete the topic and relying on the analysis, let's move from the conceptual to the practical side of the problem, answering the question of why bureaucratic structures aimed at the accelerated development of the Far East cannot become effective?

Albert Einstein famously said that "the release of nuclear energy changed everything except the way we think." Indeed, major changes, sharp turns, seem to change literally everything around, but people's train of thought often remains the same. February 24, 2022 obviously and powerfully changed our world, but the thinking about where we found ourselves and what to do remained much the same as it was three months or six months ago. This delay in thought must be eliminated as soon as possible. From this point of view, Fyodor Lukyanov's proposal to begin discussing where and how Russia should move in the new conditions is absolutely timely.

The military operation in Ukraine was not caused by Russia's desire to break the world order. It pursued a much more limited goal: to solve by force a number of geostrategic, geopolitical, and humanitarian problems in Ukraine and, more broadly, in the European direction as a whole. Politically, Russia fell out of the West's orbit back in the mid-2000s; The economic integration project of "Greater Europe" was finally buried in the mid-2010s, since then the situation has continued to deteriorate. In February 2022, a qualitative shift occurred: the growing confrontation with the West took the form of a proxy war between Russia and the United States and NATO on the territory of Ukraine.

This war fits into the complex process of changing the world order, which is based on a shift in the center of economic activity and economic power from the Euro-Atlantic region to the Indo-Pacific. Since the global financial crisis of 2008, the West has been gradually losing ground to the Asian giants -

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China and India. Russia's military actions in this context – starting with the war in the Caucasus in 2008 and especially since the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 – played the role of a trigger setting geopolitical shifts. The military operation of 2022 has become a major milestone. The point of no return in Russia's relations with America and Europe has been passed. And this affects the global situation in many ways.

The current break between Russia and the West is much deeper than the denial of the new political thinking of Mikhail Gorbachev or the “shaking of the ashes” of the communist period of Russian history. In fact, we are talking about abandoning part of the legacy of Peter the Great - a three-hundred-year tradition of positioning Russia not only as a great European power, an integral part of the balance of power on the continent, but also an integral part of pan-European civilization. The turnaround is fundamental: Russia has long wanted to “fit in” with Europe, where not everyone was happy about it. Under Gorbachev, it gave up a lot for the mere possibility of this; under Boris Yeltsin, it began to rebuild in a Western European manner, and under the “early” Vladimir Putin, it solemnly proclaimed the “European choice”, put forward the project of “Greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok” based on merging the economies of the EU and Russian Federation and even knocked on the doors of NATO.

It didn't work out. A common house in Europe has already been built and inhabited, under the general patronage of the United States, but without Russia. This is not a mistake on one side or another. The collective West could not include such a large figure into its community without shaking the foundations of its structure; expanding the foundation would mean the US abandoning its sole dominance. Russia, for its part, could not obey the rules developed without its participation and which promised it, in essence, a subordinate position in the pan-European house. Independence and sovereignty are tightly woven into the DNA of Russian statehood, into the consciousness of the people and their ruling layer.

Strictly speaking, the house built is, in fact, not pan-European, but common Western. The fact that there was no place for Russia in it is not surprising. The logical consequence of the divergence, parting, and then complete break with the West that stretched over a decade and a half is the need for Russia to perceive itself not only as a political unit separate from the political unit united on the Western platform of Europe, but also as an independent civilization, primarily in relation to Europe.

This conclusion is of fundamental importance. Modern Russia is no longer an empire, but it is also not a nation-state in the European sense of the word. Officially, our country defines itself as a multinational state. It would be more accurate, however, to call Russia a civilization-power. This civilization has largely European roots, but these roots are Orthodox

Christianity, adopted from Byzantium, along with political culture and openness to Asia; Slavic origin, language and writing belong to the European East. Before our eyes, this most important component of historical Europe - with the exception of Russia, Belarus, Donbass and still partly Serbia - has been completely absorbed by the European West, which has actually replaced the recently two-part Europe. Russia, naturally, is outside of this new formation.

But Russia is not Europe No. 2, an alternative to the European Union. In terms of civilization, it is greater than Europe. Stretching to the Pacific Ocean and occupying the entire north of the Eurasian continent, it included numerous ethnic groups that were culturally and religiously different from Europe and historically weakly connected with Europe. At the same time, these ethnic groups have been integrated into a single Russian state for centuries. This unified state differed in many ways from the classical European empires - whether overseas or continental - and is best described by the word "power".

The concept of power differs not only from the concept of empire, but also from the term “great power” as used in the literature on international relations. A power is not a hierarchy of the metropolis and colonies and not a force that surpasses the potential of rivals, but, above all, the ability to hold heterogeneous elements in organic unity and equality. This retention is possible thanks to the powerful state principle, which plays the role of a rigid rod and a flexible frame. It is no coincidence that during the upheavals of the beginning and end of the twentieth century, practically the entire territory of the modern Russian Federation remained under the rule of Russian governments and was not separated from Russia. In this regard, it is fair to conclude that a single power of such size and with such a degree of internal diversity as Russia is at the same time a separate civilization.

The core of the Russian civilization-power is the Russian people, with their language, culture and religion, but the ethnic aspect within the framework of a single civilization is not decisive. On the contrary, the Russian community is open, freely and equally accepting not only individual representatives of other ethnic groups, but also these entire ethnic groups themselves. Tatars, Yakuts, Chechens, and numerous ethnic groups of Dagestan can and are Russian. Orthodoxy is the religion of the majority, but the tradition of religious tolerance allows for the peaceful coexistence and interaction of the main indigenous faiths: Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism. A single state ensures peace, prosperity and development over a vast territory from the Baltic to the Sea of Japan and from the Arctic to the Caspian. It is the common power that is the most important value for this complex civilization.

The state, however, is itself based on a system of values, without which it collapses. The Russian

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Empire collapsed not so much under the influence of the hardships of the World War, but because of the loss of faith and trust in the supreme power. The Soviet Union died not so much as a result of a shortage of goods in stores, but because of the falsity of the official ideology, which was increasingly at odds with real life.

Legitimacy for the Russian people is not formal legality, but justice. When these two principles collide, justice is placed higher in the Russian consciousness. This is the most important lesson for the modern Russian Federation. The credit of trust given to the authorities by the people is not unlimited

The sustainability of our current state requires its “re-issue” on the principles of freedom and responsibility, social solidarity, administrative competence, practical participation in governance, including the adoption of major decisions.

In this regard, the people of modern Russia will have to rethink themselves and their country, understand the foundations of self-awareness and worldview, and decide where the Russian path should lead. Only under this condition will it be possible to determine policy goals, as well as strategies and methods for achieving them. The totality of these goals, strategies and methods can be united by the concept of the Russian idea. In short, the Russian idea can be described as Russian truth - the basis of a worldview and a set of fundamental principles, the central support of which is the imperative of justice.

Along with justice, the core of the Russian idea is the principle of equality. Russians do not imagine themselves as the chosen people; they do not have the idea of themselves as an exceptional phenomenon. Russians are not special, they keep themselves on the same level as representatives of other nations, not higher, but not lower. The Russian colonial experience was fundamentally different from that of Western Europeans. In the Russian Empire, Russians in their position did not stand above “foreigners,” and in the Soviet Union, national republics enjoyed various privileges and economic preferences, which the RSFSR was deprived of. At the same time, Russians are not ready to accept someone else’s leadership. There is no place for racism in Russian culture, and anti-Semitism - state and everyday - was considered a shameful, condemned phenomenon. Russian culture itself is open to the outside world, its influences, which are assimilated in Russian creative processing.

Thus, justice, equality, openness and reciprocity - while maintaining internal integrity - make the Russian idea a reliable spiritual guideline in developing a foreign policy strategy, especially during a period of change in the world order. The Russian idea opens up the broadest opportunities for mutual understanding, respectful dialogue and reasonable agreements with mutual goodwill. It can be perceived by other peoples and civilizations as the idea of

internal justice, external sovereignty and peaceful, good-neighborly coexistence.

Here it must be emphasized that the Russian idea is intended specifically for Russian civilization, and not as an export product for the rest of the world. An attempt to formulate one’s idea in a universalist key, as Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev’s associates did when developing new political thinking, is initially hopeless and therefore meaningless. The global world, in which the spread of the Western model has reached insurmountable limits, is increasingly diverging into civilizational platforms, where each civilization has its own idea. The Russian idea will influence the rest of the world by the very fact of its implementation in Russian society and in the politics of the Russian state.

The Russian idea does not need to be invented, it needs to be rethought for the modern stage of development. German communism and then American neoliberalism obscured for many generations of Russian people the heritage of Russian philosophers, writers, historians - from Pushkin and Chaadaev to Slavophiles and Westerners to religious philosophers and Eurasians. Nowadays, this legacy of the past, largely unexplored by us, is especially in demand so that our thoughts about the present and future gain depth. This is not about returning in thoughts and actions to a hundred or two hundred years ago, but about finding a reliable point of support in our movement forward.

No less important is the experience of practical politics of the 20th and early 21st centuries, cleared of ideology and political preferences. Rejection of communist ideology and condemnation of crimes of the Soviet period should not interfere with the possible use of certain social practices of the twentieth century. A similar approach applies to historically closer eras. It must be borne in mind that with the consistent denial of each of the main historical forms of the Russian state by its subsequent form (the Russian Federation - the Soviet Union, the USSR - the Russian Empire, the Europeanized empire of Peter the Great - the Russian Empire, and so on), the key elements of the Russian idea were inherited within the framework of this historical continuum. The “reissue” of the current form of Russian statehood will probably not be an exception.

The reissue of the Russian Federation will require, among other things, a serious and objective audit of the country’s foreign policy, taking into account the results of the special operation in Ukraine and in the context of the hybrid war with the United States and Europe. The hot phase of confrontation in Ukraine will end sooner or later, but there is no point in waiting for peace with the West: if Russia holds out - which there is no doubt about - then concrete conditions for such peace will not appear soon. It will also require a critical analysis and understanding of the experience of Russian foreign policy, starting at least from the reign of Gorbachev, and at most,

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covering the imperial period. An important goal of such an analysis is to provide material for developing the theoretical foundations of Russian foreign policy.

During the last century, these foundations were based either on the rather narrow basis of proletarian internationalism as the main form of class struggle in the international arena, or - more recently - on borrowed postulates of various Western theories. Meanwhile, each political theory is created taking into account the values and interests of a particular state or group of states, and other people's theories, even reinterpreted ones, are not enough. A Russian theory of international relations is needed, based on the interests and experience of our country and meeting its needs.

The task of theory is to provide meaningfulness to practice and increase its effectiveness. In the conditions of Russia's unequal confrontation with the united West, foreign policy is obliged to ensure the state's stability in relation to opponents and partners, maintain balance against the backdrop of shocks and promote - even in unfavorable conditions - the development of the country. Exactly how to ensure this should be the subject of quite a wide discussion.

Russian civilization is one of the important components of world civilization. It cannot and should not avoid the world's systemic problems. At the same time, based on the Russian idea as the most important basis of the country's policy, including foreign policy, the establishment of one or another form of world order should not be the main foreign policy goal of Russia, as was declared during the Soviet era. This element, central to Soviet strategy - be it in the Leninist, Stalinist, Khrushchev-Brezhnev or Gorbachev variants - must be abandoned. The world order is created - and changed - as a result of the interaction of many participants in the system, including those more powerful than Russia.

The idea of a civilizing power also differs significantly from the idea of an empire. Economic integration and comprehensive cooperation with a number of former Soviet republics are completely justified, but an attempt to restore a full-fledged center of power within the former Soviet space under Russian auspices is unlikely to be successful, since it is actively opposed by the forces of nationalism in the new states, also supported from outside. The main thing is that Russia does not need increments in order to act as a great power.

The very concept of a great power needs to be rethought. The fact that modern Russia is not a superpower has been officially recognized since the collapse of the USSR. In the modern world, however, a great power is not one that forces others to act according to its will, but exactly the opposite - it does not allow anyone to dictate their will to itself and is able, if necessary, to successfully resist the external pressure of superior power. Russia has this ability, and it also has the necessary resources to implement an

independent path of development and an independent foreign policy course. This is what makes Russia a modern great power.

The break with the West inevitably led Russia to difficult trials, but it, having finally freed it from the complexes of a follower and imitator, opened up the opportunity for the country to redefine its place, role and goals in the world. It is clear that under conditions of massive Western pressure, the priority has become maintaining sustainability by mobilizing resources and releasing the creative energy of citizens. The focus on pressing issues, however, should not distract from the development of fundamental issues that now need to be addressed in a new way.

Geographically, Russia is not part of Europe or Asia. On the contrary, the fact that the eastern part of geographical Europe and the northern part of Asia are part of Russia makes our country an important factor for its immediate and more distant neighbors. At the current stage of Russian history, the balance between the two main directions of the country's foreign policy - Western and Eastern - has obviously and unequivocally shifted in favor of the latter. This situation is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.

To maintain balance in the conditions of a hybrid war with the West, Russia in the foreseeable future will have to rely more than ever on the countries of the East - primarily China, but also India and, if possible, other countries in Asia and the Near and Middle East. These countries - to varying degrees - are becoming Moscow's most important foreign policy and foreign economic resource in the international arena. In order to use this resource to compensate for the breakdown in ties with the West and develop the country, Russia must seriously turn its face to non-Western countries not only in Asia, but also in Africa and Latin America, strengthen existing partnerships and establish new ones.

The recent mass expulsions of Russian diplomats from European and American countries indicate the path to follow.

The end of normal relations with Western countries means a sharp reduction in the need for effort - with the exception of the military and intelligence services - and for related specialists. Instead, a significant increase in expertise and practical competencies is required in neighboring countries - the Transcaucasus, Kazakhstan and Central Asia, Turkey, Iran, the Arab East, South and Southeast Asia - not to mention the world giants China and India. Non-Western organizations and forums of the EAEU and CSTO, SCO, RIC and BRICS should become priority centers of multilateral diplomacy for Russia.

Russia's role in the new international context could consist not only in defending sovereignty in confrontation with the united forces of the West, but mainly in building new models of relations within the

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non-West. A good basis for this already exists - strategic partnerships with global powers China and India, as well as with other important players such as Vietnam. There is a history of difficult, but generally positive relations with regional powers Turkey and Iran. There is experience in interaction with the ASEAN regional organization. A significant amount of cooperation has been created with countries in Africa and Latin America. These recently minor areas should now come to the fore.

Russia, of course, needs to use every opportunity to compensate for the damage caused by sanctions, but its role in the non-Western world should not be narrowly utilitarian, focused on finding ways to circumvent sanctions. It is more important to develop economic, financial, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation - given that leading non-Western countries are historically on the rise, and also that, in cultural and psychological terms, non-Western societies are in many respects closer to Russian people and national culture than most modern societies Europe and North America.

Cooperation with non-Western countries is of great importance for the formation of joint positions and broad public opinion on a large number of global issues: security, economics, trade, finance, ecology, information, culture and so on. In many of these areas, Russia can make a significant contribution to the overall work. Russia's active and constructive role can make the country one of the world's intellectual and political leaders.

Russia's behavior in the international arena should, to the maximum extent possible, correspond to Russian traditions and values, and not represent a semblance of the policies of European powers in the past, the EU or the United States in the present. Russia does not seek world domination or exploitation of other countries and peoples, does not impose its system of values on anyone, does not interfere in the internal affairs of other states, but at the same time resolutely defends its sovereignty, national interests, is faithful to its international obligations and strives for the harmonious coexistence of various states and peoples, cultures and civilizations within the global community.

In these notes about the need to put foreign policy thinking in order, they spoke, in essence, of only one aspect - the formation of the ideological and intellectual basis of Russian foreign policy. There are many other sides to this problem. We need to learn to adequately look at the rapidly changing world and understand its development trends, including in non-traditional areas of information, technology, climate, and so on for international affairs; carefully study the strategy and tactics of the enemy, as well as partners and neutral states; learn to fight better in the information field, including on your own territory. But with all this, we need to start from the basics: who we are, where we are, what we stand for - and why.

Main part

Approved on March 31, 2023, the Foreign Policy Concept (FPC) became the sixth in the Russian Federation and the fifth since the beginning of the century. No requirements, including and the validity period in relation to the KVP in Russia is not provided, but in accordance with the Federal Law "On Strategic Planning in the Russian Federation" there is a rule on updating the key strategic document - the National Security Strategy - every six years. The KVP is based on it and develops its foreign policy provisions. The current version of the National Security Strategy was approved at the beginning of July 2021, after which the topic of developing a new KVP was updated.

The legal basis for the CVP is traditionally the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which, due to recent amendments affecting, among other things, certain principles of foreign policy, has created additional prerequisites for updating the Concept. In particular, the approved CVP literally repeats the fundamentally significant constitutional norm of Article 79: decisions of interstate bodies adopted on the basis of international treaties in their interpretation, contrary to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, are not subject to execution in Russia. In addition, the State Council is included among the participants in the formation and implementation of the country's foreign policy as a new constitutional body with powers in the foreign policy sphere.

Immediately after the publication of the KVP, attention was drawn to the norm about the special position of Russia as a unique state-civilization. To a certain extent, this concept stems from a key constitutional innovation: "The Russian Federation, united by a thousand-year history, preserving the memory of our ancestors who passed on to us the ideals and faith in God, as well as the continuity in the development of the Russian state, recognizes the historically established state unity." The mentioned article of the Concept, which defines Russia's role in the world, contains another atypical characteristic of the country as a Euro-Pacific power. On the one hand, this expands the established view of the Euro-Asian or Eurasian nature of the Russian state, on the other, it formulates a new dimension of the Euro-Pacific region with other prospects for building communications and inevitable opposition to the Western idea of the Indo-Pacific space.

The KVP specifies certain provisions of the National Security Strategy, as well as other strategic planning documents, in particular those approved in 2022, the Concept of Humanitarian Policy of the Russian Federation Abroad and the Fundamentals of State Policy for the Preservation and Strengthening of Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values.

First of all, a fundamentally new section has appeared, where the strategic guidelines of foreign policy are concentrated, integrating it into a single

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vector and at the same time distinguishing it from other areas of state policy - “National interests of the Russian Federation in the foreign policy sphere, strategic goals and main objectives of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation.” The concept of national interests is always closely linked to foreign policy activity, however, since previous versions of the KVP did not provide their formulations, the

understanding of Russian national interests often became the subject of speculation. Despite their rather general but clear listing in the National Security Strategy, the different “flanks” and “towers” of the diverse Russian society could afford free interpretations. Today Russian national interests look like this:

Table 1. National interests of the Russian Federation

National Security Strategy	Foreign Policy Concept (national interests in the foreign policy sphere, additions to the Strategy norms are highlighted in black)
1) saving the people of Russia, developing human potential, improving the quality of life and well-being of citizens	6) saving the people of Russia, developing human potential, improving the quality of life and well-being of citizens
2) protection of the constitutional system, sovereignty, independence, state and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, strengthening the country’s defense	1) protection of the constitutional system, sovereignty, independence, state and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation from destructive foreign influence
3) maintaining civil peace and harmony in the country, strengthening the rule of law, eradicating corruption, protecting citizens and all forms of property from illegal attacks, developing mechanisms for interaction between the state and civil society	4) protection of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and protection of Russian organizations from foreign illegal attacks
4) development of a safe information space, protection of Russian society from destructive information-psychological influence	5) development of a safe information space, protection of Russian society from destructive foreign information-psychological influence
5) sustainable development of the Russian economy on a new technological basis	7) promoting sustainable development of the Russian economy on a new technological basis
6) environmental protection, conservation of natural resources and rational use of natural resources, adaptation to climate change	9) environmental protection, conservation of natural resources and rational use of natural resources, adaptation to climate change
7) strengthening traditional Russian spiritual and moral values, preserving the cultural and historical heritage of the people of Russia	8) strengthening traditional Russian spiritual and moral values, preserving the cultural and historical heritage of the multinational people of the Russian Federation
8) maintaining strategic stability, strengthening peace and security, the legal foundations of international relations	2) maintaining strategic stability, strengthening international peace and security 3) strengthening the legal foundations of international relations

It is important that Russia has acquired not only a specific list of national interests, but also a system for their implementation in strategic goal-setting. Nine national interests (detailing and deepening the formulations from the National Security Strategy) are implemented through three strategic goals that integrate and direct the activity of Russian diplomacy from now on:

- 1) ensuring the security of the Russian Federation, its sovereignty in all spheres and territorial integrity;
- 2) creation of favorable external conditions for the development of Russia;
- 3) strengthening the position of the Russian Federation as one of the responsible, influential and independent centers of the modern world.

In turn, the three strategic goals are achieved through the solution of fourteen main tasks formulated

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in the same section. The remaining sections of the CVP, therefore, already represent tools for solving them - priority areas of foreign policy, its regional directions, as well as mechanisms for its formation and implementation.

The structuring of national interests, goals and objectives of foreign policy activities presented in the CVP form a more understandable and logical framework for further actions of the country and its representatives in the international arena. It is impossible not to pay attention to the lack of mention of national development goals, which since 2018 have become a top-level priority for all government bodies and in accordance with which all policy areas should be structured, regardless of the industry and action horizon. However, the fact that the National Security Strategy, in accordance with which the KVP was developed, is directly based on national development goals, allows us to consider the latter as a mechanism for achieving national development goals on the external contour.

The priority directions of foreign policy have replaced the priorities of the Russian Federation in solving global problems, which in the previous editions of the CVP were quite stable. Previously there were six of them, now there are nine, the following have been added:

1. Ensuring the interests of the Russian Federation in the World Ocean, outer space and airspace.
2. Environmental protection and global health (separated from international economic and environmental cooperation).
3. Protection of Russian citizens and organizations from foreign illegal attacks, providing support to compatriots living abroad, international cooperation in the field of human rights (previously, human rights were combined with international humanitarian cooperation).

In addition, the task of “Strengthening international security” has become a priority direction of “Strengthening international peace and security”.

Regional foreign policy directions have also been radically restructured. Instead of the largely Western-centric priorities revealed in the logic of “CIS – West – Arctic and Antarctic – Asia-Pacific – Middle East – Latin America and the Caribbean – Africa,” a fundamentally new sequence was formed, namely:

1. Near Abroad (perhaps for the first time as an official term)
2. Arctic
3. Eurasian continent. China. India
4. Asian-Pacific area
5. Islamic world
6. Africa
7. Latin America and the Caribbean
8. European region
9. USA and other Anglo-Saxon states

10. Antarctic

Among the declared regional destinations, only three countries are directly named: China, India and the USA. Otherwise, the regional directions generalize foreign policy vectors and delve much less into the bilateral agenda than previous editions of the Concept.

There is an attempt to truly take a new approach to planning not just diplomatic work, but also international interaction. Here is the already mentioned originality of the state-civilization, and a rethinking of the geography of regional directions, and a closer attention to history, and the final postulate about the need for an ever wider involvement of constructively minded social forces in the foreign policy process in order to form a national consensus regarding foreign policy.

For the first time, making an attempt to comprehensively and scrupulously define Russia’s place in the world, the Concept provides a domestic interpretation of the concept of “great power” - albeit conditional, but invariably in demand in real international relations. The CVP names ten parameters that legitimize not only the status, but also the ambitious priorities of that very state-civilization in the external environment - it is in them that it is easy to grasp the self-perception of a great power, namely:

- 1) the presence of significant resources in all spheres of life;
- 2) status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council;
- 3) participation in leading interstate organizations and associations;
- 4) one of the two largest nuclear powers;
- 5) the state is the legal successor of the USSR;
- 6) decisive contribution to victory in World War II;
- 7) active role in the creation of a modern system of international relations;
- 8) active role in eliminating the world system of colonialism;
- 9) one of the sovereign centers of world development;
- 10) fulfilling a unique mission to maintain the global balance of power and build a multipolar international system, providing conditions for the peaceful, progressive development of humanity based on a unifying and constructive agenda.

On the one hand, as a rule, it is not customary to find added value in focusing on one’s own merits. On the other hand, if you don’t praise yourself, no one will: Russia regularly tries to explain on various platforms on what grounds it claims a place “on the ground”, why on earth is its critical opinion, for example, regarding the “rules-based order”, should be of interest to someone. The answer was often very situational and sometimes incoherent, unable to withstand the weight of fundamental differences with counterparties, whose narratives are notable for their

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coherence. Now Russia is not only not ashamed of its disagreement, but also declares its indisputable right to it.

Another new norm of the Concept eliminates the need for euphemisms and saves time for really necessary communication. Relations with other countries can be constructive, neutral or unfriendly, which will be determined by the attitude of these countries themselves towards Russia. Among the principles on which a just and sustainable world order should be based, the authors of the Concept note a spiritual and moral guideline common to all world religions and secular ethical systems. Previous editions spoke about the common (but not unified) spiritual and moral potential (KVP-2016) or even the denominator (KVP-2013) of the main world religions.

The concept captures the politicization of various areas of international cooperation, which is interpreted as negative trends that Russian foreign policy should counteract. Among these are the politicization of the international payment infrastructure, environmental and climate change activities, cooperation in healthcare, sports, human rights, dialogue and interstate interaction in various areas in the Asia-Pacific region.

Despite respect for the UN as the main platform for coordinating interests and codifying international law, the CVP emphasizes the serious pressure that is being put on the organization, and for the first time does not mention a word about reforming the world's leading structure. All recent editions have placed emphasis on rational reform of the UN, but now they talk about the need to restore its role as a central coordinating mechanism.

Previously, there was usually talk about reforming the executive structures of the OSCE, which would increase the relevance and authority of this largest regional platform. In the current Foreign Policy Concept, Russia no longer addresses the need for such reform, as well as the OSCE itself, which is mentioned sporadically as one of the multilateral formats in the European part of Eurasia.

The current KVP significantly strengthens the ideological principles of Russian foreign policy. Thus, for the first time within the framework of the Concept, the concept "Russian World" is used: the role of Russia in its civilizational community is twice noted. In conditions of active rejection, even outright demonization, of the idea of the Russian World in some Western countries, Russian foreign policy confidently takes up its public defense. For the first time, the concept of Russophobia appears, counteracting which develops certain priority areas of foreign policy. It is obvious that previously, due to the seeming marginality of the corresponding movements, it was not necessary to set such a task separately, but new challenges required a direct diplomatic response to attempts to discriminate against everything Russian.

For the first time in the KVP, the concept of "color revolution" is mentioned. Although the main peak of threats associated with this phenomenon occurred in 2000–2010, it did not fall into the regulatory framework of strategic planning. Rather, it remained a stable marker to designate a special class of practices of interference in the internal affairs of states, as a rule, in the post-Soviet space. After the events of 2014 in Ukraine, the term "color revolution" seemed to have lost its relevance. But against the backdrop of a transition to greater straightforwardness in the designation of political guidelines, as well as a constant return to reflection on the nature of the Ukrainian crisis, Russia now clearly indicates its intention to suppress the instigation of "color revolutions" and other attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of its allies and partners. In other words, there will no longer be any recognition of the "free choice" of the people if there is a conviction that it is not free and not a choice at all.

For the first time and immediately, the Concept speaks very extensively about the problem of neocolonialism. The active role of Russia in the elimination of the world system of colonialism and the ongoing process of the irreversible retreat into the past of the model of accelerated growth of colonial powers due to the appropriation of resources is pointed out. The priority of any state renouncing neocolonial ambitions is noted, and solidarity is expressed with African countries seeking to eliminate the inequalities that are worsening due to sophisticated neocolonial policies.

The idea of uniting efforts around countering neocolonialism has been actively penetrating domestic foreign policy discourse in recent months - after President Vladimir Putin's landmark speech at a meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club in the fall of 2022, where he emphasized the neocolonial essence of the Western model of globalization.

Among the main tasks of foreign policy, the formation of an objective perception of Russia abroad is again mentioned. And within the framework of priority areas for promoting international development and humanitarian cooperation, goals are outlined for the formation and strengthening of a positive perception of Russia in the world. International humanitarian cooperation itself no longer appears simply as a linear type of activity, but is divided, in fact, into two areas. One is related to the goals of creating a positive perception and strengthening Russia's role in the global humanitarian space, a separate aspect of which remains the development of public diplomacy mechanisms. The second is aimed at strengthening the moral, legal and institutional foundations of modern international relations: countering the falsification of history, the spread of neo-Nazism, racial and national exclusivity. Particularly noteworthy are changes in the goal-

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setting of parliamentary diplomacy. All previous versions were limited to the universal formulation that the Federation Council and the State Duma contribute to increasing the effectiveness of parliamentary diplomacy. In the new edition, they contribute to the fulfillment of the tasks of parliamentary diplomacy.

A more symbolic innovation should be the absence of any mention of soft power in the text of the CVP. All 2010s in key foreign policy documents it was placed among the integral components of international politics and permeated domestic political rhetoric regarding the desire for a more effective self-positioning of the country. Russia actively encouraged the use of soft power tools, developed relevant institutions, and even occupied not the worst positions in various ratings and indices. For many reasons, but most importantly, probably due to the foreignness of the term “soft power” for Russian soil, interest in it began to fade at a certain point.

Along with the rejection of soft power, the Concept emphasizes the factor of power in its traditional understanding. The thesis about increasing its role reproduces the norms of previous editions, but for the first time the realities of the formation of new spheres of military action and the unleashing of a hybrid war against Russia are analyzed in detail, and the directions of foreign policy response are formulated.

For the first time, the possibility of Russia using armed forces is allowed. Noting its commitment to Article 51 of the UN Charter on Self-Defense, the CVP lists the following grounds for the use of armed force, namely:

- 1) repelling and preventing an attack on Russia and (or) its allies;
- 2) crisis management;
- 3) maintaining (restoring) peace in accordance with the decision of the UN Security Council and other collective security structures with the participation of Russia in their area of responsibility;
- 4) ensuring the protection of its citizens abroad;
- 5) combating international terrorism and piracy.

It is emphasized that in relation to the West, where the bulk of unfriendly states are located, Russia has no hostile intentions, it does not isolate itself from it and does not consider itself its enemy. She simply expresses an attitude in response to the attitude towards herself. Reciprocity becomes not so much a part of politics as such, but a form of implementation of the spiritual and moral guideline “an eye for an eye,” proposed as the basis of a multipolar world. Reciprocity is a continuation of genuine sovereignty, where there is always a place for the good will of an independent player who does not experience worries because of obstacles put in front of him and leaves a chance for the resumption of relations, but at the same time - where there is a place for a forceful response in the case when “they don’t want to -good.”

Regional areas of foreign policy form a marked list of ten regions, mentioned in order reflecting the degree of their priority. For the first time, the minimum number of states is mentioned directly - there are 18 of them in the text, and in this case it is no longer correct to talk about priority, since the mention occurs precisely within the framework of different regional areas, namely:

1. Belarus
2. Abkhazia
3. South Ossetia
4. People's Republic of China
5. Republic of India
6. Mongolia (mentioned within the Russia-Mongolia-China economic corridor)
7. Afghanistan
8. Iran
9. Syria
10. Türkiye
11. Saudi Arabia
12. Egypt
13. Israel
14. Brazil
15. Cuba
16. Nicaragua
17. Venezuela
18. USA

For the first time, the European Union does not appear among regional priorities; it is mentioned only once, along with NATO and the Council of Europe in the context of unfriendly European states. The European region itself (precisely this wording) is predictably viewed as the third from last direction of foreign policy and through the prism of individual European countries. The condition for relations is “the awareness by European states that there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial equal cooperation with Russia, increasing the level of their foreign policy independence and the transition to a policy of good neighborliness.”

For the first time, the KVP introduces the concept of Anglo-Saxon states, which are included in the cohort of “and others” in the context of interaction with the United States and together with them form the penultimate regional direction. In relation to the United States, a “combined” nature of relations is formulated, including the perception of both one of the influential sovereign centers and as “the main inspirer, organizer and executor of aggressive anti-Russian policy.” There is essentially nothing to talk about with other Anglo-Saxon states: everything will again be determined by their attitude towards Russia.

For the first time, Africa is becoming not just an independent direction of foreign policy, but also a clearly expressed priority. Russia stands in solidarity with the anti-colonial aspirations of African states, and Africa itself is defined as a distinctive and influential center of world development. The CVP expresses support for the principle of “African

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problems - African solutions”, and in addition to strengthening bilateral relations, a number of multilateral structures with which Russia intends to deepen interaction are noted: the African Union, the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum, the African Continental Free Trade Area, the African Export-Import bank, etc.

The emphasis on multilateral formats is traditionally placed in the context of Latin America and the Caribbean as a separate regional area of foreign policy. Here, however, on the contrary, the number of priority associations for cooperation has been reduced from seven (in previous versions) to six (the Union of South American States has been excluded due to internal disagreements). Among other things, for the first time, support for Latin American states under pressure from the United States and its allies is noted in ensuring sovereignty and independence.

Conclusion

The modern system of governance of the Far East contains all the basic elements of a developing state. At the same time, each of them is marked by significant transformations, leading in total to the actual degeneration of Far Eastern policy. The case of the Far East enriches the very theory of the developing state, since it allows us to focus on the main reasons for these transformations. We can identify three reasons, namely:

- 1) multitasking, covering not only economic but also broad social goals (the most controversial of which in terms of achievability is ensuring population growth in the Far East);
- 2) lack of autonomy (since we see the dependence of the new policy on large commodity corporations and regional authorities in providing quantitative performance indicators);
- 3) structural weakness of the Ministry of Eastern Development (struggle to maintain positions in the government hierarchy, lack of administrative powers and formally established opportunities to influence key decisions in the economic sphere).

The study also gives grounds to recognize that new instruments for the development of the region have become a means of increasing the political capital of the Ministry of Eastern Development to compensate for its inherent weaknesses and deficits. Behind the facade of the information campaign is the traditional approach to the development of the region through large government programs and corporate projects. The task of building a new economy, outlined in 2013, through the creation of an institutional infrastructure that ensures new relations between the state and investors, has faded into the background in front of large raw materials and image projects promoted with the help of undeniable strategic arguments. And here we return to questions closely related to practical politics: is this still a

process of transformation of a developing state or is it already the result of the process? Will the accumulation of political capital contribute to a return to the original goals or will it lead to their further erosion? The answer to these questions requires further research, but the analysis carried out in the article made it possible to identify three main directions for applying efforts to correct the course.

The innovative nature of the Foreign Policy Concept does not negate the inconsistency of such documents. On the one hand, due to their regulatory nature, they become a direct guide to action for the entire diplomatic vertical and any related departments in the medium term. On the other hand, since life does not stand still and changes the situation described in the Concept in the very next moment after its approval, the document still turns out to be, as a rule, insufficient to reflect the needs and intentions of the country in such a complex and turbulent world. Entering the operational space of the state-civilization allows us to acquire a new quality of political-spatial thinking, in which there is no place for discrete parameters: all directions become potentially major, and all paradigms become conditional and fleeting.

The task of the new Concept of foreign policy, as, indeed, of any other plan in conditions of permanent chaos, is to gather together the elements of the previous order scattered by the global storms that have already passed, to reckon with “friend or foe” and step fully armed towards new cataclysms. The ability not only to survive, but also to turn the situation to one’s advantage is a skill, the mastery of which becomes a test for everyone, and the formulated foreign policy priorities are designed to contribute to this.

Aid initiatives for Ukraine in 2022 demonstrate a number of unprecedented changes due to the current geopolitical situation: donor states use aid as a tool for foreign policy and national interests.

First. The speed of response of Western donor countries at the very beginning of the conflict. Reliance on the experience of interaction with the recipient country and logistics networks built in previous decades, coupled with the atypical unity of Western countries, which acted as a united front against the start of the Russian special operation, ensured increased response speed. The main thing that spurred donors to action was the stated foreign policy goal of keeping Kyiv in its sphere of influence in the face of a serious geopolitical threat, that is, the forceful return of Moscow’s control over Ukraine. If the West, when providing assistance in 2022, was guided, as donors claim, by humanitarian motives, it remains unclear why Brussels and Washington ignored Kiev’s requests to help vaccinate the population during the second wave of the pandemic (asking for a vaccine from Moscow was impossible for political reasons).

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Second. The leading role of donor states, not NGOs. Donor states presented the unfolding scenario as exceptional, unique in its kind. This narrative reinforced the relationship between aid and foreign policy goals. Aid was perceived as an effective tool to counter Russia's special operation in Ukraine. Values and narratives of political intervention took precedence, overshadowing the pacifism and neutrality that dominated scenarios where non-governmental donors played a leading role.

Third. Volume and diversification of mobilized assistance. The combination of political intervention and the resources available to the public sector ensured a significant flow, which is unusual for the initial phase of the conflict. The intervention was carried out in areas (financial, political-institutional, military) that go beyond the scope of traditional humanitarian activities. All this created ideal conditions for negative phenomena: from the dispersion of aid to corruption, duplication, and the inability to coordinate the activities of donors and keep records of their interventions.

Fourth. Anticipatory post-conflict planning. As soon as the conflict began, two initiatives were proposed that were ideal for the post-war phase: reconstruction of the country and Ukraine's path to EU membership. In the first case, the technical problem was the inability to estimate the resources and amount of assistance required. Politically, the question was whether donor states would be able to cope with the problems we have already seen in the recovery phase in other countries (Bosnia, Afghanistan, Kosovo), without a detailed assessment of the reasons for the limited effectiveness of the support that the West provided to Ukraine from 1991 to 2021. Regarding Ukraine's membership in the European Union, the technical aspect is obtaining candidate status regardless of the completion of the complex process of harmonization with European Union legislation. The political aspect is associated with the unity of the bloc in assessing the compliance of candidate countries (as in the case of the admission of Romania and Bulgaria) and member countries (disagreements with the Visegrad Four) with appropriate standards.

Fifth. "Sanctions for the enemy, help for friends." The evolution of sanctions is one of the main

innovations in the Ukrainian scenario. In recent decades, sanctions have already transformed from "the last step before war" to "the best remedy instead of war." Therefore, they began to be used more often - sanctions wars broke out, becoming a favorite tool of diplomacy in the post-bipolar world. In the context of the Ukrainian crisis, sanctions, as opposed to an instrument of assistance, have undergone further radical changes, turning into a tactical and strategic resource in the confrontation. Now they began to be used not only to strike one of the warring parties, but also to provide advantages to the other side. Sanctions have become weapons, and weapons are now promoted as a legitimate form of aid, so sanctions aimed at an enemy inevitably become aid to a friend.

Sixth. Food as a weapon, weapon as help. One of the main intricacies of the Ukrainian crisis is the use of food and weapons by Russia and the West, respectively. On the one hand, Moscow has turned access to raw materials into a tactical tool of pressure, on the other, the European Union has made weapons a central element in assisting Kyiv.

The impact of these disruptive trends in care practice is likely to be long-lasting. Due to politicization, previously apolitical food aid has been transformed into an instrument of tactical confrontation. Western donor states, by openly supplying arms to Ukraine, approved two new political principles. First of all, the provision of weapons has acquired full legitimacy as a form of assistance. In other words, the tendency to consider only "good" aid as "real" aid – humanitarian or development – has been overcome for the sake of the idea that interstate aid can be any transfer for the benefit of the recipient. Moreover, and this is the most important thing, the right to self-defense, in fact, is now recognized as a basic need, therefore, the need for weapons is humanitarian.

As with the US "preventive intervention" in Iraq in 2003, the risk is that a rhetorical formula imposed today for the sake of short-term political considerations may become a precedent that will later be turned against the very actors who introduced it. – precisely because of its inherent contradictions and weaknesses of definition.

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