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WHY ARE WE HIDING THE OUTFLOW OF RUSSIANS FROM THE NORTH CAUCASUS FEDERAL DISTRICT?

Abstract: In the article, the authors analyze the reasons for the outflow of the Russian population from the North Caucasus Federal District, which provoked an acute shortage of highly qualified personnel, which are so necessary not only today, but what is especially important, tomorrow for the modernized leap of the Caucasus. It is for this reason that the enterprises of the defense-industrial complex, which at one time provided up to 90% of the economy of the North Caucasus Federal District, are almost completely inactive, which has led the situation to the economically depressed state that is typical today for most regions of the North Caucasus Federal District. But at the same time, it is disappointing that the republican authorities are afraid of publicizing the facts of oppression of the Russian population and highlighting the trend of outflow of Russians from the North Caucasus. This is explained by the fact that they do not want to spoil the overall image picture in their republics, which ultimately affects the amount of funding from the federal center to these totally subsidized regions.

Key words: extremism, radicalism, inter-ethnic split, North Caucasian republics, multi-ethnicity, outflow of the Russian population, identity, restoration of ethnic business, modernization, development of the regions of the North Caucasus Federal District, people's rights, migration problems, Russian Federation.

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Introduction

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Intolerance, religious extremism, terrorism, radicalism among young people, problems in interethnic relations worry the state and citizens. This is reflected in the media by the growth of publications on interethnic and interethnic issues and is an indicator of public attention to the problem. The number of publications in the press and media interest in ethnic problems has a steady upward trend, especially in the southern regions of the Russian Federation. In the North Caucasus, there are factors of interethnic tension that have regional specificity, unlike continental Russia. Particular tension in interethnic relations is caused by territorial disputes, the solution of which, even in the legal field, carries the danger of interethnic split, especially in such multi-ethnic entities as the Republics of Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia. The situation is aggravated by the unresolved consequences of the political and economic crisis in the North Caucasus, and in these republics in particular. The most unprotected in this regard were the representatives of the Russian people: the migration of Russians within the republics of the North Caucasus Federal District and their massive outflow from Dagestan to other regions of Russia can only be compared in scale to general mobilization, so widespread has this process become. Now in Dagestan, in order to find a Russian citizen of the republic, especially outside the capital and one of the "Russian" regions, you need to show considerable diligence. The Russian people, who gave everything to the Caucasus, from education to industry, are today forced to flee, giving away their property for next to nothing, abandoning fertile inhabited lands. At the same time, there is a division of citizens into Russians and non-Russians. There is no special executive body for national policy in the republic, and there is no direct work with the population. The Government Commission of Dagestan on Issues of the Russian Population was unable to organize its work properly, and in many respects even worsened the already difficult situation of the Russians; did not stop the outflow of population from the republic and did not create conditions for the return of Russians who had left. As a result, these processes acquired ethno-confessional urgency and became a socially dangerous phenomenon. The role of local governments in the prevention of interethnic tension and interethnic relations in general is weak, although everyone is aware that the overwhelming majority of interethnic conflicts occur at the local level. Perhaps local governments do not have the necessary powers. Growing migration activity also provokes interethnic tension. Migration from the national republics of the North Caucasian Federal District to other regions leads to the formation of large ethnic communities of mountain peoples in the receiving regions, increasing

labor competition. Such migration changes the ethnic composition of the population in the receiving region and is the main reason for the growth of interethnic tension. Essentially, these are enclaves that will develop without assimilation processes. At the same time, there is a growing influence of Muslim religious communities - "jamaats", which creates fertile ground for the development of extremist ideas in the form of the most radical trends - Wahhabism and Salaffism. Increasingly recently, representatives of the Russian population of the North Caucasus have been observed to adhere to Islamic ideals. Many Russians actually find protection in Islam, observe its rituals and lead an Islamic lifestyle. Involving ethnic Russians in the ranks of their followers is considered by Wahhabis, who recognize terrorism as the most effective way to achieve their goals, a priority direction for disseminating their views. This is how the number of Slavs who converted to Islam and took Muslim names is growing; it is through them that missionary activity is carried out throughout continental Russia, expanding the number of adherents of the movement for the "purity of Islam."

In the multi-ethnic republics of the North Caucasus, the factor of the "Russian language" as a means of interethnic communication and international education is gradually being replaced by Arabic. Arabic is becoming a rallying point for young people. Thousands of young people today are forced to seek knowledge outside the Caucasian republics, because the "intelligentsia" and the official clergy are not able to give what the youth are looking for. For example, for Dagestani youth "Daavat" - a call to faith, is the basis of today's realities. Young people are being recruited into the ranks of the Wahhabis, and ethnic separatism is developing against the Russian people and the Slavs as a whole. Some experts consider these processes to be a response to the actions of skinheads in large cities of the country. Adding fuel to the fire is the constant talk about the creation of the Islamic Republic and the separation of Dagestan from Russia, which also increases migration. As a result, the uncontrolled mass exodus of Russians turns into the rise of titular ethnic groups in the republics. The physical squeezing of Russians out of the Caucasus republics also aggravates relations with the Cossacks. The true reasons for the outflow of the Russian population from Dagestan have not yet been officially determined. The assertion that the main reason is their difficult socio-economic situation is clearly untenable, if only because their situation is exactly the same as that of the rest of the population of Dagestan. The mass outflow of the Russian population, the most educated group among the residents of the North Caucasus regions, also continues from the other national republics. In fact, this means Russia's withdrawal from the Caucasus. The modernization of the North Caucasus Federal District, formulated by the President as the main task facing Alexander

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Khloponin, was complicated primarily by the fact that to this day the outflow of the Russian population, that is, the most qualified personnel who are so necessary today for the modernization leap, continues in this region regions of the Caucasus. The vast majority of Russians who left the North Caucasus republics between 1989 and 2020 were teachers, doctors, highly qualified workers, engineers, high-tech specialists and scientists. It is for this reason, for example, that enterprises of the military-industrial complex in the Caucasus republics, which at one time provided up to 80% of the economy of these republics, are almost completely inactive. And this is just one of a number of examples. The combination of such factors largely led the situation to that economically depressed state. Despite the fact that the outflow of the Russian population continues, human rights organizations operating in the North Caucasus, including the Memorial Foundation, SOVA etc., record only those cases of violations that relate exclusively to the oppression of representatives of North Caucasian ethnic groups by local authorities and the federal center, especially by security forces. At the same time, facts of violation of the rights of the Russian population, in particular, facts of oppression of Russians by both local authorities and the “titular” population of the republics of the North Caucasus Federal District, are not given any publicity or consideration. The same tone is supported by Kavkazcenter.com and the Caucasian Knot. Because of this, an extremely one-sided picture of what is happening in the North Caucasus is created, and this, in turn, causes a number of serious problems for the Russian leadership in relations with such Western structures as the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the European Parliament, the Commission on Human Rights and other organizations. Strange as it may seem, the local media of the republics of the North Caucasus Federal District, controlled by the republican authorities, work in the same vein, namely, they hush up the facts of oppression of the Russian population. And if human rights activists and extremists are trying to pit the federal leadership of the Russian Federation against each other and Western structures involved in monitoring the human rights situation, thereby creating political problems for the Russian authorities, then in the situation with local media the motives are completely different. Republican authorities are afraid of publicity of facts of oppression of the Russian population and highlighting the trend of outflow of Russians from the North Caucasus due to the fact that they do not want to spoil the overall image picture in their republics, which ultimately affects the volume of funding from the federal center to these totally subsidized regions. Thus, with regard to the topic of the outflow of Russians from the republics of the North Caucasus, including Adygea, a kind of “conspiracy of silence” is emerging. It is not profitable for local authorities to

advertise these facts for economic reasons. External ones predominantly Western human rights foundations and the media they supervise create a one-sided picture of what is happening, trying to legitimize the increased political pressure of the West on the Russian leadership. In this context, the main task of the Russian authorities is to conduct a scientific sociological study designed to restore a full picture of what is happening in the North Caucasus in order to identify the reasons for the outflow of Russians, describe them, and immediately begin to develop constructive solutions to these problems. These decisions, in turn, should eliminate the catalysts for the outflow of Russians from the North Caucasus, over time reverse the situation and lead to the beginning of an influx of Russians to the North Caucasus Federal District. Only the return of highly specialized Russian personnel and the saturation of the Caucasian infrastructure with Russian specialists in the industrial and agricultural complexes will solve the modernization tasks that were set for Khloponin. Ultimately, the general recovery of this region, initiated by the influx of Russians, should provoke its transition from the category of unprofitable regions to the category of donor regions. An empirical study conducted by the authors of the report “North Caucasus: The Russian Factor” (published in the spring of this year) brings its own to this picture adjustments and additional aspects, namely:

firstly, the North Caucasus News Agency, which appeared recently and actively supplied factual material to the authors of the report, aims to create an information resource that, through its activities, would balance the one-sided anti-Russian picture formed by the already mentioned portals, the SOVA analytical center and similar resources;

secondly, the report itself puts on the agenda the problem of geopolitical destabilization of the North Caucasus, in particular, it describes the consequences of the influence of the Western vector on the North Caucasus, the purpose of which is to “sever it” from Russia, transfer this region and place it under the geopolitical control of the West.

The means to achieve this goal are precisely to stimulate the outflow of the Russian population, the loss of administrative and military control over the region by the federal center. In this regard, the “Russian Vector” in the North Caucasus should be aimed at stabilizing the situation, at preserving the territorial integrity of Russia - that is, at preserving the North Caucasus under the geopolitical control of Moscow. In addition, the report describes the history of the outflow of Russians from the North Caucasus, starting in the late 60s, shortly after the “Grozny uprising” of 1957, when Russians began to leave as a result of ethnic pressure from the Chechens rehabilitated by Khrushchev, and ending in the 2000s. It provides statistics on the outflow of Russians by year and region. So Dagestan in the period from 1979

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to 1988. More than 31 thousand Russians left Kabardino-Balkaria, a little over three thousand, North Ossetia about 20 thousand, and Checheno-Ingushetia more than 56 thousand people. But over the next decade, the number of Russians who left rapidly increased. The reasons for this: the beginning of the genocide of Russians in Chechnya, the rapid ethnicization and growth of separatist sentiments, the spread of Islamism and, ultimately, the first and second Chechen campaigns. From 1989 (the last Soviet census) to 1998 (the last year of the “Khasavyurt peace”) about 35 thousand Russians left Dagestan, more than 7 thousand Kabardino-Balkaria, and about 9 thousand people left North Ossetia. Naturally, the record holders were Chechnya and Ingushetia - more than 256 thousand people left voluntarily. To these should be added the violent “loss” of another 9 thousand people, and this is only according to official statistics. How many Russians “died” during the period of Dudayev’s genocide against Russians is now quite difficult to establish. If according to the 1989 census, the total share of Russians in the North Caucasian republics reached 26% (in absolute figures - 1359 thousand people, with the total population of the republics - 5305 thousand people) and varied from 9% in Dagestan to 68% in Adygea, then by the last census 2002 this figure fell to 15%, or 994 thousand people. That is, since 1989, to 2002 the negative balance of the Russian population amounted to more than 360 thousand people. At the same time, the index of representation (RI) of Russians among heads of government bodies in the North Caucasus republics continues to decline. If in 1989 the ratio of the number of representatives of titular ethnic groups among heads of government bodies and their structural divisions to heads from among Russians in Kabardino-Balkaria was 0.57, then in 1999 it was 0.57. the same index in Kabardino-Balkaria was 0.47. The same in other republics: North Ossetia - 0.58 in 1989. versus 0.36 in 1999, etc. The oppression of the Russian population in the North Caucasus republics did not end in the 2000s. So in 2015-2022. According to the State Statistics Committee, at least 20 thousand people left the Karachay-Cherkess Republic (10.7% of the total number of Russians in the Karachay-Cherkess Republic). More than 22 thousand people (about 9% of the total Russian population) left the relatively calm Kabardino-Balkaria. Modern sociological surveys show that the Russian population is still inclined to leave the republics of the North Caucasus: about one third of those surveyed. Thus, 31% of Russian residents of Nalchik (Kabardino-Balkaria) want to leave for another Russian region, and among Kabardians and Balkars this figure is only 9%. In Vladikavkaz, 17% of Russians and 9% of Ossetians expressed a desire to leave North Ossetia, in Maykop - 28% of Russians and 1% of Adygeis. A significant part of Russians consider the interethnic relations

developing in the region to be bad. In Ingushetia, half of the Russians and only 9% of the Ingush think so. In Karachay-Cherkessia there are a quarter of Russians, 8% Karachais and 11% Circassians. The Russian population of the North Caucasus openly talks about restrictions on their rights. In Ingushetia, 57% of Russians and 25% of Ingush say this; in Chechnya – 40% Russians and 21% Chechens; in Kabardino-Balkaria - 29% Russians, 9% Kabardians and 21% Balkars; in Dagestan - 17% Russians and 13% Dagestanis. In Vladikavkaz, 54% of Russians and 25% of Ossetians surveyed spoke about inequality of opportunities for different ethnic groups to receive higher education; in Grozny – 40% Russians and 17% Chechens; in Nazran – 43% Russians and 16% Ingush; in Nalchik - 54% Russians, 56% Balkars and 25% Kabardians. 56% of Russians in Karachay-Cherkessia report ethnic inequality in employment; in Chechnya – 79%; in Kabardino-Balkaria – 73%; in Adygea – 68%. 18% of Russians in Karachay-Cherkessia and 20% of Russians in Dagestan declare a connection between their ethnic origin and their difficult financial and economic situation. Two-thirds of Russians in the North Caucasus reported ethnic inequality in their ability to be elected or appointed to leadership positions, and more than 13% described themselves as victims of humiliation or insult based on their Russian or Orthodox identity. In 2023, the outflow of Russians continued. Today, the main reason for the migration of the Russian population from the North Caucasus to other regions of Russia is economic preconditions - low living standards, unemployment, clanism, which is increasingly affecting the authorities and economic institutions of the republics of the North Caucasus.

Main part

Among the numerous mines laid under the foundation of Russia by the Bolsheviks and their heirs, the North Caucasus occupies a very significant place. During the civil war, the Red internationalists did not find anything better than to give the Chechens and Ingush the primordially Russian lands of the Terek Cossacks. Thus, the Cossacks, hated by the gang that captured Russia, were suppressed and support from the mountaineers was ensured. On November 17, 1920, the Bolshevik “Congress of the Peoples of the Terek Region” officially proclaimed the destruction of the Terek region and the creation in its place of the Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the formation of which was approved by the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of January 20, 1921 of the year. National districts were created within the newly-minted “republic,” which were later to serve as the basis for the formation of separate autonomous regions. The cities of Grozny and Vladikavkaz became independent administrative units. At the same time, under the pretext of “liquidating the consequences of the agrarian policy

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of tsarism,” “On the agrarian issue, recognize the need to return to the mountaineers of the North Caucasus the lands taken from them by the Great Russians, at the expense of the kulak part of the Cossack population, and instruct the Council of People’s Commissars to immediately prepare an appropriate resolution,” wrote V.I. Lenin. On October 14, 1920, the Politburo adopted a resolution according to which the allocation of land to the highlanders was to take place at the expense of the “kulak part of the Cossack population.” District party conferences held locally in the spring and summer of 1921 decided to resolve the agrarian issue in the North Caucasus by “alienating surplus Cossack lands for the permanent allocation of landless mountaineers.” To ensure these decisions were made by the decision of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), which was then headed by G.K. Ordzhonikidze, [tens of thousands of Cossacks were evicted from their homes within 24 hours](#). Half of them, including women and children, were simply destroyed. “Five villages were evicted militarily. The recent uprising of the Cossacks provided a suitable pretext and facilitated the eviction; the land came into the possession of the Chechens. The situation in the North Caucasus can be considered undoubtedly stable,” I.V. reported to Lenin. Stalin. In the order of the Acting Commander of the Caucasian Labor Army Medvedev we read: “Art. Burn Kalinovskaya; the villages of Ermolovskaya, Zakan-Yurtovskaya, Samashkinskaya, Mikhailovskaya - to be given to the poorest landless population and, first of all, to the mountainous Chechens who were always loyal to the Soviet regime: why should the entire male population of the above-mentioned villages from 18 to 50 years old be loaded into trains and sent under escort to the North, for heavy forced labor; old people, women and children should be evicted from the villages, allowing them to move to farmsteads or villages in the North; horses, cows, sheep and other livestock, as well as property suitable for military purposes, should be transferred to the Cavalry Army - its relevant bodies, and the horses will be distributed according to the instructions of the Front Headquarters.”

Having done away with the Terek Cossacks and giving them the lands of “loyal” Chechens, the Bolsheviks began to increase the autonomy. Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, North Ossetian and Ingush Autonomous Okrug... In January 1934, the unification of the Chechen and Ingush regions took place. On December 5, 1936, the Checheno-Ingush and North Ossetian autonomous regions were transformed into autonomous republics. To manage the autonomous regions, cadres of the national bureaucracy were cultivated in the Bolshevik party schools. The Stavropol region was not spared from the redrawing of borders. And in 1937, the Kizlyar National District was created in the southeastern part of the region. The policy of

“Chechenization” was interrupted by Hitler’s attack on the USSR. Instantly turning 180 degrees and forgetting all “internationalism,” the Bolsheviks, with the usual bitterness, began to repress the already “loyal” Chechens and Ingush. After the mass deportation of peoples, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was liquidated. Most of its territory, together with part of the Stavropol Territory and the abolished Kizlyar National District, was united into the Grozny region formed on March 22, 1944. However, the time has come for a “thaw”. This strange “thaw” mourned the “commissars in dusty helmets” and did not shed a single tear for the Russian peasants... In the same way, it rehabilitated the Ingush and Chechens, without even for a moment remembering the exterminated Terek Cossacks. Nikita Khrushchev returned the highlanders to their native lands, restored the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic at the expense of the territories of the disbanded Grozny region and a significant part of the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, from which the eastern regions with cities such as Nazran (formerly Costa-Khetagurovo), Malgobek, Karabulak, etc. were cut off. In addition, the Cossack left bank of the Terek was slaughtered for the offended peoples. This significant event took place in 1957. A year later, a little-known Russian riot took place in Grozny. “In 1957 alone, over 200 thousand people arrived in the autonomous republic, which significantly exceeded the figures provided for by the four-year resettlement plan. This created serious problems with employment and housing. In addition - the massive acquisition of weapons, mutual responsibility, murders based on blood feud, rape, attacks on residents of the republic representing other nationalities. The arriving sheikhs, mullahs and teip authorities, influencing young people in a nationalistic and religious spirit, sought to revive the ideas of muridism and obedience to Sharia law. Quarrels over houses and garden plots, scandals and group fights with the use of bladed weapons and firearms have become commonplace throughout the republic. For example, at the end of 1957, anti-Russian leaflets were distributed in Grozny, and attacks by Chechen youth on students of vocational schools and officers of the Soviet Army were also recorded. “Things are very bad,” one of the Russian residents of Chechnya wrote to her relative in Russia, “Chechens come, do whatever they want, beat Russians, slaughter, kill, set houses on fire at night. The people are in panic. Many have left, and the rest are gathering.” And indeed, as a result of intimidation, with the full connivance of the republican authorities, during 1957, 113 thousand Russians, Ossetians, Avars, Ukrainians and citizens of other nationalities left the Chi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The justified indignation of the population at the atrocities of hooligan elements from among the Chechens, as well as the inability of the authorities to

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really protect non-indigenous residents, provoked the Russian population of Grozny into mass riots that occurred in the city on August 26 and 27, 1958. On the evening of August 23, 1958, in the suburb of Grozny, the village of Chernorechye, where most of the people lived workers and employees of the Grozny chemical plant, Chechen Lulu Malsagov, while drunk, started a fight with a Russian guy, Vladimir Korotchev, and stabbed him in the stomach. A little later, Malsagov, along with other Chechens, met Yevgeny Stepashin, a factory worker who had just been demobilized from the army, and stabbed him several times. Stepashin's wounds turned out to be fatal, but Korotchev was saved." On August 26, the first rally against the atrocities of the Chechens takes place in Grozny. A group of youth broke into the regional committee and tried to force the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Chi ASSR Gayerbekov, the second secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU Chakhkiev and other workers to the square. However, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs managed to expel the demonstrators from the regional committee and detained the most active of them. The meeting was dispersed by garrison soldiers and police. However, the very next day, as Matveev writes, "about 10 thousand people gathered on Lenin Square. The speakers persistently repeated their demands - to release the comrades arrested the day before. Calls were heard from the speakers above people's heads: "Free the arrested youth!", "Exile the Chechens from Grozny!" By 2 p.m., part of the crowd of more than a thousand people approached the buildings of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic. Several people entered the balcony of the Ministry of Internal Affairs building and demanded the release of all those detained the day before. Under pressure from the masses, the authorities made concessions and released everyone. The resolution of the meeting addressed to the authorities was also hastily written. "Taking into account the manifestation of a brutal attitude on the part of the Chechen-Ingush population towards the peoples of other nationalities, expressed in massacres, murders, violence and bullying," it said, "the workers of the city of Grozny, on behalf of the majority of the population of the republic, propose, namely: On the evening of August 23, 1958, in the suburb of Grozny, the village of Chernorechye, where workers and employees of the Grozny chemical plant mainly lived, Chechen Lulu Malsagov, while drunk, started a fight with a Russian guy, Vladimir Korotchev, and stabbed him in the stomach. A little later, Malsagov, along with other Chechens, met Yevgeny Stepashin, a factory worker who had just been demobilized from the army, and stabbed him several times. Stepashin's wounds turned out to be fatal, but Korotchev was saved." On August 26, the first rally against the atrocities of the Chechens takes place in Grozny. A group of youth broke into the regional committee and

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Affairs of the republic. Several people entered the balcony of the Ministry of Internal Affairs building and demanded the release of all those detained the day before. Under pressure from the masses, the authorities made concessions and released everyone. The resolution of the meeting addressed to the authorities was also hastily written. "Taking into account the manifestation of a brutal attitude on the part of the Chechen-Ingush population towards the peoples of other nationalities, expressed in massacres, murders, violence and bullying," it said, "the workers of the city of Grozny, on behalf of the majority of the population of the republic, propose, namely:

- *from August 27, 1958, rename the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic into the Grozny region or into the Interethnic Soviet Socialist Republic;

- *the Checheno-Ingush population is allowed to live in the Grozny region no more than 10% of the total population;

- * resettle advanced progressive Komsomol youth of various nationalities from other republics to develop the wealth of the Grozny region and for the development of agriculture.

Unable to get through to Moscow, the crowd headed to the long-distance telephone exchange. While trying to get inside, chemical plant worker Andrianov was killed by security and two other people were injured. Under the threat of violence, telephone operators nevertheless organized a connection for the rally activists with the reception of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Khrushchev. At 11 p.m., a group of demonstrators with a red banner headed to the Grozny station and delayed the departure of the Rostov-Baku train. People walked around the carriages and asked passengers to tell residents of other cities that "in Grozny, Chechens are killing Russians, and the local authorities are not taking any measures." The following inscriptions appeared on the outside of the carriages: "Brothers! Chechens and Ingush kill Russians. Local authorities support them. Soldiers are shooting at Russians!" Around midnight, troops appeared at the station, but the rally participants threw stones at them. Butts were used. Soon the crowd was dispersed and the train was sent to its destination. At the same time, military units managed to restore order in the square near the regional committee building. The next day, police and state security agencies began an intensive search for active participants in the riots. Every day there were more and more new arrests, the number of which exceeded a hundred. Over the next two months, the local court barely had time to announce sentences: from a year of probation to 10 years in prison. Among the articles of indictment against the convicted person was Article 59-2 (mass riots). This is how the authorities dealt with those who dared to doubt the correctness of its course." The authorities did not draw any conclusions from this prologue of future bloody

events in the region. They were not made in the "new" Russia, where hardly anyone remembered the events of 1958. Exactly according to Khrushchev's patterns, the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of Russia of March 15, 1992 recognized illegal repressive acts against peoples subjected to forced relocation - Chechens and Ingush, but not a word was said about the tens of thousands of exterminated Cossacks. Signed by Boris Yeltsin on April 26, 1991, the RSFSR Law "On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples" in Art. 6 even proclaimed the "territorial rehabilitation" of peoples officially declared "repressed", with the organization of "measures for the restoration of national-territorial borders that existed before their unconstitutional violent change," as well as the return of "repressed peoples" to their "places of former residence on the territory of the RSFSR". Of course, there was no talk of returning the lands to the Cossacks and restoring the Terek region liquidated by the Bolsheviks. What happened next must be memorable for everyone... "Pogroms, robbery and murders of the non-Chechen population began in Chechnya already in the spring of 1991 (and did not meet with opposition from Moscow)," wrote A.I. Solzhenitsyn. - Moreover, Chechen leaders and active militants did not fail to take advantage of the collapse of the state in the fall of 1991. Dudayev seized power and declared the independence of Chechnya, which the Chechens have always warily craved. Unprepared for anything, devoid of historical thinking, the Russian leadership immediately impulsively declared martial law in Chechnya, but, two or three days later, lifting it due to its impotence, only made itself look ridiculous. And here is the first mystery of the further three years of inaction: the Russian military command ceded abundant weapons of all kinds, including aviation, to the self-proclaimed Chechnya. Some powerful secret interests of some high spheres in Moscow dictated behavior "as if nothing had happened." The same abundant flow of Tyumen oil was sent to the Grozny oil refinery, without bringing Russia even the comparative value of this oil; the difference went to someone, was divided somewhere. State subsidies to Chechnya and all other economic and transport connections with it also continued. And in Chechnya itself, unbridled terror was being unleashed against the non-Chechen population, and mainly the Russians. The Chechens arbitrarily insulted and humiliated Russians, robbed, took away property, apartments, land plots, killed, threw them out of windows from floors, raped, kidnapped women, men, and children from kindergartens - many disappeared without a trace. "Russians! Get out of Chechnya! Russian cries were heard from Chechnya, Russians came with complaints and knocked on the door of Russian authorities - but for all three years they remained indifferent. There was no administrative or judicial protection for anyone. And about the fate of this half a million non-Chechens - the

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entire Russian press, now so free, was silent for all three years! And Russian television did not show us any tearing scenes or corpses for three years. And for three years the most distinguished Russian “human rights activists” were complacent, revealing the composure of our educated society. (For all three years, I know of only one report from Chechnya in a Moscow newspaper: that in the first six months of the Dudayev regime in Chechnya, every third resident was subjected to violence - of course, a non-Chechen.) This was, as they now say, ethnic cleansing, but from It became visible to the whole world in Bosnia, but to no one from Chechnya. Neither the UN, nor the OSCE, nor the Council of Europe.”

It would seem that this bloody story could really teach decision-makers nothing? It turns out she could. On January 19, 2010, by presidential decree, the North Caucasus Federal District was formed, into which, strictly according to Bolshevik patterns, in addition to the Caucasian republics, the Russian Stavropol region was included. In subsequent years, the media occasionally reported on the situation in the region becoming increasingly tense. “The power structures know that the situation in the Stavropol region has long been developing according to a scenario unfavorable for Russian statehood,” the correspondents stated. At the level of regional leadership and law enforcement agencies of the Southern and North Caucasus federal districts, meetings are regularly held where alarming information is made public. Most operational and analytical generalizations boil down to the fact that in the Stavropol Territory, the squeezing out of the Russian and Russian-speaking population continues at a rapid, let us emphasize, rapid pace. The eastern regions of the region take the lead in this regard. The Cossack and Russian population of villages, former farmsteads and villages is declining due to the outflow of people to other regions of Russia. In addition, the natural decline of old-timers continues. According to law enforcement agencies, the Stavropol region is inhabited mainly by immigrants from Chechnya and Dagestan. In addition to the fact that the purchase and seizure of agricultural land is underway, the eyes of the new population of the region are turned to the well-maintained and promising region from the point of view of tourism development in the Caucasian Mineral Waters region. The situation is so alarming that in a conversation with a correspondent, “one of the representatives of the government structures stated directly: “We have lost the Stavropol region...”. I think this statement doesn’t really need any commentary.” “You will soon be leaving home here and running away” - interethnic peace in the Stavropol Territory, it seems, remains only on paper. Dozens of detainees, knives, guns, fights, murders - the region has become a new zone of instability in Russia,” - so in 2021. [wrote "Moskovsky Komsomolets"](#). In a large article in the newspaper, the Stavropol Territory is

referred to as Russian Kosovo. Having given a long list of ethnic conflicts and crimes against Russians in the region, the correspondent notes: “It came to the point that at one of the meetings of the regional government, the chairman of the regional Duma, Yuri Bely, said: “We are sitting on a powder keg. Problems arise all over the region. On the Internet, people respond en masse to us like this: “We will show Alexey and Ivan who are the bosses here!” The governor of the region, Valery Zerenkov, proposed forming Cossack troops of up to a thousand people, armed with traumatic weapons, under law enforcement agencies. I was born in Grozny and remember very well what processes took place there in the late 80s and early 90s,” says Yevgeny Boyarsky, an activist of the New Force social movement. “Then we saw the explosive growth of nationalism. Up to 300 thousand people fled from the republic at that time, thousands of Russian-speaking people were killed before the start of the first Chechen war. According to my observations, now the situation in the region is at the level of the Chechen situation. Head of the Levokumsky district Nikolai Naphanyuk: “We have a population of 40 thousand people in our region. Every year 300–400 Russian-speaking families leave, that’s a fact. Now in our region the ratio is as follows: 75% Russians, 25% visitors. At the same time, about 70% of business and land are concentrated in the hands of visiting Dargins. The corruption of the previous leaders led to this situation. Whoever paid ordered the music.” Demographer, professor of the Stavropol State Agrarian University, Doctor of Political Sciences Yuri Efimov: “The Russian population is not so actively reproducing itself, but the Caucasian population is more active. Migration processes play into the hands of Caucasian ethnic groups. If earlier there was a huge influx of Russians from the national republics into the region, now it has been exhausted - everyone who could have already left. The situation is especially difficult in the east of the region. In 2020, I received carte blanche from the regional authorities to study the current situation. My assistants and I toured these areas, studied the situation in detail, and put forward a number of proposals to the governor. But no one wanted to do anything. We studied in detail the migration, demographic, socio-economic spheres of the eastern regions. The most difficult situation is in 5 of them: Neftekumsky, Budennovsky, Levokumsky, Kursk, Arzgirsky. Apart from our research, no one has even studied in detail the problem of migration flows and the interaction of newcomers with indigenous residents. Municipalities ring the bells, they see everything locally, but at the regional level it is easier for officials to pretend that nothing is happening.” The war in Novorossiia largely diverted public attention from the events in the Stavropol region. Experts who predicted an explosion in this region after the 2014 Olympics were wrong. An explosion occurred in

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Kyiv. However, this, of course, did not solve the problem of Stavropol. In 2015, Russian activists of the Stavropol Territory appealed to the authorities with a demand to recognize the state - the constitutive status of the Russian people. In their address to the president, they, in particular, indicated: "The strategy for the socio-economic development of the North Caucasus until 2025, developed under the leadership of Alexander Khloponin, does not assume the presence of a Russian ethnic and cultural component in Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan, and therefore in the future and in other subjects of the North Caucasian Federal District, including the Stavropol region." This appeal went unheard. "The Stavropol region is no longer a buffer territory on the path of radicals. This is a source of tension. In Stavropol there are places of compact residence of people who have recently become neophytes. This is a fertile environment for those who can form a radical jamaat. The situation itself contributes to this. There is a colossal outflow of the Russian population from the eastern regions of Stavropol and even from Stavropol itself. The indigenous population is being replaced. It is proceeding very systematically and systematically. A new cultural environment is being created. It is obvious that this process is being managed. Wahhabi preachers stimulated the influx of new population, radical ones, into the republics of the North Caucasus. Now it is going to the Stavropol region. A jamaat is formed. Then there is a conflict over land, then there are conflicts over pastures, and local residents no longer have the opportunity to graze their livestock... These people are financed from closed Islamist funds, from not very legitimately operating commercial organizations, this is very actively supported by Western grant-giving organizations. The preconditions are being created for the indigenous population to leave. The goal is for the Caucasus to cease to be Russian." "If this process continues to intensify, then in addition to the fact that the radical component will intensify, the economy will also decline at a colossal pace. Unfortunately, in our opinion, these processes are already irreversible in the Stavropol region." Having come to power in 1917, the Bolsheviks began to carry out the so-called. international policy. But it is much more accurate to call this policy anti-national. Anti-Russian. Its result was the collapse of the Russian state, colossal demographic losses of the Russian people and many mines that continue to detonate. Communist power has not officially existed for more than 26 years. But over all these years, its policy on national issues remains essentially unchanged. The processes, the irreversibility of which the RISS expert speaks of, are

truly irreversible in the current conditions. In order for these processes, as well as other similar ones (separatist, centrifugal) to become reversible, Russia needs a Russian national policy, which would be based on the interests of the state-forming people, the well-being and growth of which is the only guarantee of the existence of Russia as such. The adoption and implementation of such a policy is a matter of survival of our people and our country. And it is precisely the implementation of such a policy that would become a real, and not a formal, end to the most catastrophic period of our history - the Bolshevik period, and would mean a genuine overcoming of it. However, alas, There are no prerequisites for such an overcoming yet. The state system of the Russian Federation continues to follow false international-multinational dogmas. We have seen what this leads to more than once over the last century and, especially, the last decades. And God forbid we see this again - now in the Russian Stavropol region. It should be clarified that after the initial encouragement of national minorities in the fight against the Russians as the main enemy of communism, the Bolsheviks began to suppress the religions of all peoples, including the Chechens - which is why their uprisings followed, so did hopes for the German "liberators" during the war... The punitive expulsion of Chechens by Stalin "for cooperation with the occupiers" in 1944 only added fuel to the fire. They returned from exile embittered "against Moscow." The memory of this, according to [Chechen historian Avtorkhanov](#), played a big role in the emergence of the current anti-Russian separatism. Of course, after the first connivance, Moscow finally correctly suppressed the independent terrorist-slave-owning "Ichkeria" of Dudayev-Maskhadov-Basayev. But instead of restoring justice to the expelled 300 thousand Russians, Putin decided to buy the loyalty of the Chechens with money, which is obvious to everyone. From 2007 to 2015, Chechnya received 539 billion rubles from the federal budget in the form of subsidies, subventions and subsidies. Their annual volume averaged 60 billion rubles, and according to this indicator, the republic is one of the three most subsidized regions (only Dagestan and Yakutia received more in 2013 and 2014). According to the Ministry of Finance, in 2014, 81.6% of Chechnya's budget came from the federal budget. Only Ingushetia had more - 85.6%. In terms of subsidies per capita, Chechnya, however, is in 8th place (41.5 thousand rubles) after the Chukotka and Nenets Autonomous Okrugs, Magadan Region, Altai, Yakutia, Tyva and Ingushetia ([picture 1](#)).

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Figure 1 – Free assistance to Chechnya

“This is not the main problem of the North Caucasus Federal District, however, almost every researcher has noted, to one degree or another, a noticeable decrease in the outflow of Russians from the North Caucasus regions. Noticeably fewer people began to leave Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. For North Ossetia, this problem has always been less pressing, but for Ingushetia and Chechnya the problem has remained at the same level,” she told Russian Planet. The professor considers even the empirical conclusions of the authors of the reports sufficient, since they all live locally. “Immersed in the situation, they can observe on the spot, and even if this is not a completely sufficient, but quite objective method,” she said. Carnegie Moscow Center expert Alexei Malashenko also believes that the outflow has decreased, but explains this phenomenon simply - there is no one left to leave. “Yes, in these republics they treat Russians with great respect, but only the older generation,” he told Russian Planet. — In Ingushetia and Chechnya, it seems, there are no Russians at all anymore. So what is the outflow?” The problem can be solved, Malashenko is sure, but financial support should become noticeably higher. “If, like the military in the Caucasus, coefficients were also added to the salaries of teachers, doctors, specialists, then there would be interest, honor, and an incentive to return and stay,” he said. Officials take credit for stopping the flight of Russians. In recent years, both federal and local authorities have constantly announced multimillion-dollar programs “for the return of Russians.” However, many experts are confident that such programs are either a banal “washing” or simple PR. Thus, in Chechnya, back in 2017, they launched a targeted program “The return and settlement of the Russian and Russian-speaking population who previously lived in the Chechen Republic.” There were reports that the Russian-

speaking population had begun to return, and figures were also given: up to 300 returning families by October 2018. By the time the two-year program was completed in March 2020, a representative of the Ministry of Nationalities of the Chechen Republic admitted that the program remained at the draft stage, since the republican budget was not enough, and the federal budget was not generous for these purposes. Lawyer Kaloy Akhilgov, a former press secretary of the President of Ingushetia, believes that the outflow of Russians has indeed slowed down, but has not stopped. He sees the reason that “the crime situation has stabilized.” But the Russians, he said, are in no hurry to return. “In reality, Russians are reluctant to return. There are examples, but they are rare. I believe there is no such flow for which a program would be necessary,” said Akhilgov RP. As you know, the flight of Russians began in the 90s, primarily from Chechnya. In the “zero” years it decreased, tension around the Russian minority gradually subsided. The exception was Ingushetia, where the Wahhabis began a direct campaign to push out the Russians in 2006-2007. They distributed threatening leaflets, and even backed up these threats with direct attacks. One of the victims was the deputy head of the Sunzhensky district administration, Galina Gubina, which oversaw the then-current program for the return of the Russian-speaking population. Thus, in July 2007, in the village of Ordzhonikidzevskaya (Sleptovskaya), an elderly teacher Lyudmila Terekhina and her two adult children were killed, and then militants planted a bomb in the local cemetery and detonated it during Terekhina’s funeral, when her colleagues came to say goodbye to her, she was injured 10 people. But since then, the republic has become much calmer; there have been no open threats against the Russian population.

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In Kabardino-Balkaria, at the end of 2013 and the beginning of last year, rumors spread about mass attempts to rape Russian girls on the streets, but the authorities did not note attacks based specifically on ethnicity. In the Stavropol and Krasnodar territories, fights with stabbings are still recorded, which acquire an interethnic character. As Abdulla Istamulov, adviser to the head of the administration of the head of Chechnya, notes, in other parts of Russia the stereotype remains that the Caucasus is dangerous. "People are not ready to go yet; stereotypes and fears are too deep in their minds," he told RP. In August last year, a program for the return of Russians was launched in the most multinational republic of the North Caucasian Federal District - Dagestan. The program is aimed at the northern part of the republic, where Russians live compactly: Tarumovsky and Kizlyarsky districts, the city of Izberbash. According to the program, the authorities are even ready to give Russian families money for the purchase or construction of cottages and to facilitate their employment.

The head of the Tarumovsky district, Marina Abramkina, echoes Malashenko - the outflow has indeed decreased, but only because there is no one left to leave. "Who's left here? Established families, those who live in joint marriages, and old people who have nowhere to go," Abramkina told Russian Planet. Meanwhile, the program to attract Russians, according to her, is still working - several families who once left Dagestan have returned to the area. "We already have requests from 52 families who want to return. There are also those who have never lived in Dagestan before, but have expressed a desire to move," said the first deputy minister for national policy of the republic, Zikrula Ilyasov. "A third of them are already settling in, according to the program they should be allocated funds for the purchase of housing, the decision has already been made", only the bureaucratic part remains," Ilyasov complains. — What's interesting is that they say that they haven't taken root in other regions because of the difference in mentality. In Dagestan, their social well-being is better, they say." The program also covers the usual development of the northern regions. For example, 10 million rubles were spent on road repairs. In the next one, 100 million rubles are planned, the official said. As part of the program, money is also allocated to Cossack communities. However, the official admits: "The program is currently sequestered due to the financial situation." According to the program, not only those who lived in Dagestan before can come, but also any Slavs in general - citizens of Russia. Thus, it was under this program that the republic accepted refugees from Ukraine for permanent residence. True, the program does not explain by what criteria Slavic origin is determined; Ilyasov could not answer this question either. Ilyasov believes that the reverse flow of Russians will begin anyway - after the first families

of immigrants have been settled. According to statistics, since 1989 (the last Soviet census) to 1998 (the last year of the "Khasavyurt peace") about 35 thousand Russians left Dagestan, more than 7 thousand - Kabardino-Balkaria, and about 9 thousand people left North Ossetia. The record holder, naturally, was the former Checheno-Ingushetia - the exodus from there reached 256 thousand. If, according to the 1989 census, the share of Russians and Russian speakers in general in the North Caucasian republics reached 26% (in absolute figures - 1.359 million people, with the total population of the republics - 5.305 million). The Russian "share" varied from 9% in Dagestan to 68% in Adygea, but by the 2020 census this figure had dropped to 15%, which amounted to 994 thousand people. That is, the outflow amounted to more than 360 thousand people.

The 2020 census also records the outflow of Russians, although at a slower pace. So, for example, in Dagestan over 8 years there were fewer Russians by 1.1%, in Kabardino-Balkaria - by 2.6%, in Karachay-Cherkessia - by 2.1%, in Ossetia - by 2.5%, in Chechnya - by 1.8%. There are one percent fewer Russians even in the Russian region itself—Stavropol.

The life of Russians and genocide in Karachay-Cherkessia. A Russian resident of the Karachay-Cherkess Republic N.V. Potemkin wrote a letter to me.

Hello Oksana! What you write about about the Stavropol region happened to my Motherland in the mid-90s, my Homeland is Cherkessk, although I don't like this name. The population of the republic of the Karachay-Cherkess Republic was more than 60 percent Russian, but we were betrayed by our representatives in power, the Russians/Jews sold seats in parliament, seats in the leadership of the republic in the regions, 20 percent of us remained, mostly old people.

The Soviet people - the Russians did not have their own identity (they were not self-organized) unlike the Caucasian peoples. The Russians lost, now we are outcasts, we are not in the leadership of the Karachay-Cherkess Republic and business (with the rare exception of 1 percent). What is happening in your Stavropol region happened to us - "one to one". I'm very worried about you - hang in there!

We can start with the fact that the city of Cherkessk was founded on the site of the victory over the Turks and Caucasian peoples in 1825 as the village of Batalpashinskaya. In my opinion, the population of the Karachay-Cherkess Republic now is 50% Karachais, 30% Circassians and Abazas, 20% Russians, this is a rough estimate, there are a few more - Nogais, Chechens, Armenians, Greeks, etc.

Throughout the 90s, there was a struggle for power in the republic between the Karachais and the Circassians/Abazas, the Karachais won, seizing the government, the police and all profitable enterprises in the republic, all this took place against the backdrop of squeezing out Russians from everywhere. There

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was an active resettlement of Karachais from villages to the city. Russians were oppressed at all levels, at school, at work, on the street they could be severely beaten, those who could left.

By 2007, the seizure and redistribution of spheres of influence ended, no one rebelled anymore, everyone accepted Karachay's superiority as a given. (In the parliament of the Karachay-Cherkess Republic, each nation is represented by deputies in a number proportional to the number of this people; this is a puppet government). Over the past 25 years, the Russians have been trying to send their children away with instructions not to return.

Since 2010, life has become calmer in terms of the manifestation of open nationalism, everyone started making money, legalizing illegal things, but the trouble is that Russians in this action were given the maximum role of workers; of course, there can be no talk about any leadership positions. It's the same in the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russians were ousted from there by various methods.

You can also mention the annual Moscow commissions in the government and the Ministry of Internal Affairs; it is not difficult to guess that they are greeted with special hospitality and sent back significantly richer. The situation in the Ministry of Internal Affairs is interesting, there were years when Moscow appointed leaders within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, fat men came, imposed tribute on all city and district police departments and district police departments and lived here like ambassadors from the "Golden Horde." Naturally, all this burden fell on ordinary people in the form of extortion and cop setups. Everyone in the republic knew how this scheme worked.

God forbid that a Russian gets into the Karachay-Cherkess Republic in a "mintovka", they will hang all the hang-ups on you, sell your house, car, force you to take out a loan to get out and still close it for show.

I will never say that all Caucasians are bad, they helped me out many times in different situations, but just as many times they created problems for me. There are decent people among them, but if the question becomes which of your friends will you marry, a right Russian or a wrong Russian, the answer is obvious - for your friend in any case, no matter how wrong he is.

My son is in the first grade, out of 31 students, only three are Russian, at first it was hard for him, he fought every day, he came in torn clothes, scratched, once he came all bitten, but he showed character, did not allow himself to be broken, now he is calmer. Parents scold Russian children for fighting at school, but with Caucasians it's different - the woman is silent, and the father will always praise if his son beat someone and teach him how to fight if he loses. I think I'll send him somewhere to Russia later.

I myself work in a small organization among the Karachays, the team is good, I have no complaints

about the leadership, they are decent people, but I also have no future in the Karachay-Cherkess Republic. I know that in many regions of the Stavropol region, the heads of the internal affairs department are Caucasians and the service personnel are gradually changing their nationality - this is a disaster. I hope the Russians of Stavropol still have a chance to organize themselves and rectify the situation, I really hope.

And maybe I haven't heard of such a phenomenon yet - "shabai". This is the name given to Russian slaves who are kept by force on the farms of the Karachays; there are such people in the Stavropol region. The power structures know that the situation in the Stavropol region has long been developing according to a scenario unfavorable for Russian statehood. At the level of regional leadership and law enforcement agencies of the Southern and North Caucasus federal districts, meetings are regularly held where alarming information is made public. Most operational and analytical generalizations boil down to the fact that in the Stavropol Territory, the squeezing out of the Russian and Russian-speaking population continues at a rapid, let us emphasize, rapid pace. The eastern regions of the region take the lead in this regard. The Cossack and Russian population of villages, former farmsteads and villages is declining due to the outflow of people to other regions of Russia. In addition, the natural decline of old-timers continues.

According to law enforcement agencies, the Stavropol region is inhabited mainly by immigrants from Chechnya and Dagestan. In addition to the fact that the purchase and seizure of agricultural land is underway, the eyes of the new population of the region are turned to the well-maintained and promising region from the point of view of tourism development in the Caucasian Mineral Waters region.

The situation is so alarming that in a conversation with a Segodnya.ru correspondent, one of the representatives of the government structures stated directly: "We have lost the Stavropol region." I think this statement doesn't really need any commentary. The only thing we can add is that in the next two years there will be no reaction to the reduction of the Russian range in the North Caucasus. They will try not to tritely advertise the crisis situation, for example, due to the 2014 Winter Olympics, a global event.

However, a similar practice of silence and concealment exists not only in the North Caucasus, but throughout Russia, when clashes on national and religious grounds are classified as "everyday life", and the notorious Article 282 is mainly used in relation to the media and public figures, which made it possible to openly and directly declare the genocide of the Russian people.

Where is the mass exodus and extinction of the Russian population in the Stavropol region? Considering the tendency and the federal center's

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emphasis on powerful national Caucasian clans, which is clearly demonstrated by the prosperity of Chechnya, one can assume that even after the Olympic competitions, the de-Russification of the Stavropol Territory will not cause any special emotions in Moscow. To this end, they will hold a couple of seminars and conferences on the topic of tolerance and mutual respect between peoples in Pyatigorsk, which is turning into a multicultural center, and they will also put an end to the plenipotentiary's report.

The exclusive promotion of Plenipotentiary Khloponin to the Cossacks, which caused so much misunderstanding among the Cossacks, apparently brought little to the Terek Cossack Army as a whole, which never recovered into a single whole after the genocide of the early 20th century.

But the situation is such that the church is no longer silent. In particular, the head of the Synodal Committee for Interaction with the Cossacks, Bishop Kirill of Stavropol and Nevinnomyssk, sounded the alarm about what was happening. The clergy finally began to realize that along with the construction and decoration of churches, which is facilitated by local authorities, there is another, hidden trend - the number of parishioners in these churches is declining. And the day is not far off when a priest will have to make his way to a service in a Cossack village, bypassing entire clearings of Russians bent over in prayer.

One can give an example of the Grozny fortress, the development of which was contributed by General Ermolov, hated in de-Russified Chechnya. Until recently, residents of the neighboring Stavropol region were brought to the restored Grozny Church of St. Michael the Archangel for Easter, and the rector of the temple now has to live on the territory of a guarded complex of government buildings. Otherwise it's not safe.

"The main reason for the outflow of the indigenous population can be called uncontrolled migration from neighboring republics. Maybe migrants come with good things. But, having a completely different mentality, culture and religion, they cannot always integrate into the environment in which they come to live," Bishop Kirill said in an interview published in the Stavropol Blagovest newspaper.

According to the bishop, aliens often behave "very aggressively, forcing Russians to leave their lands," although "Russian and Caucasian peoples lived quite peacefully for centuries," and this needs to be learned again, "to learn the culture of living together."

Bishop Kirill is especially concerned about the situation in the east of the region, where "terrorist attacks and Wahhabism" are a big problem. In this regard, the bishop, who received "the blessing of His Holiness the Patriarch to support the Russian-speaking population," gave the task to his assistants to analyze the situation in the eastern deaneries, began to

collect information from various sources himself, held several meetings at which we developed a program for intensifying spiritual, educational, missionary and social work in the eastern regions of the Stavropol Territory."

Of course, the Word of Christ was preached in incredibly difficult, terrible circumstances both in the first centuries of Christianity and in subsequent times. Confessing Christ is a sacrifice of oneself, in which there are no compromises, which is confirmed by the feat of Yevgeny Rodionov, who accepted martyrdom in Chechnya, and hundreds of other examples of confession in the North Caucasus today.

It is obvious that the Russian world, shrinking like shagreen skin, is faced with a different, aggressive environment that does not accept dissent. We will reap the fruits of this development of events again and again. In this regard, the words of one of the Orthodox elders that Russians need to prepare for martyrdom, otherwise they will have to forget about their Russianness, sound more relevant than ever. There is no other option for survival. Soul survival.

And you shouldn't be so skeptical about the words of the old men from the Taman department of the Kuban Cossack Army, who believe that they will live to see the border again pass along the Kuban River, like two centuries ago. History, as we know, develops in a spiral.

Conclusion

Thus, the ideas of "Russian separatism" or the introduction of apartheid will not solve any of the pressing problems of the complex region and Russia as a whole. On the contrary, their practical implementation can provoke new conflicts, spur the isolation of various parts and ethnic groups of Russia, as well as the fragmentation of the country as a whole. However, the statement of this thesis does not mean at all that the authorities defending the current status quo can limit themselves to just routine criticism of extremists. The idea of "escape from the Caucasus" is fueled not only by catchy populist slogans, but also by the inaction of those who, by their status and position, should be involved in the prevention of ethnic and religious excesses, and the legal resolution of property, household and other disputes.

Consequently, the main task of today remains the real, and not the formal, arrival of the Russian state in the North Caucasus. In the form of an integrating force, a fair arbiter and a guarantor of security. Take, for example, such a story as the conscription of young men from the North Caucasus republics into the Russian army. In a multi-ethnic state, the conscript army becomes not just a power structure, but the most important tool for the integration of different segments of society. For the overpopulated and labor-abundant Caucasus, with its high unemployment rate and average age of 26–28 years, the army can become a good social elevator and a real alternative to the

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underground and criminal business. Speaking about the socio-economic development of the region, we should focus primarily not on the interests of large metropolitan businessmen, but on projects that will provide opportunities to the local population (jobs, involvement of small businesses), which in turn will create additional “anchors” for loyalty. And, of course, with the help of effective internal migration programs, the state will solve several problems at once (development of neglected and sparsely populated regions, reducing the demographic burden on the Caucasus, involving its residents in all-Russian processes). State support for civil society institutions in the Caucasian republics could create mass support for countering clanism and corruption. However, when discussing these measures, one should keep in mind: outside the all-Russian context, changes in the North Caucasus will not happen. Without qualitative changes in the entire state mechanism and a radical reform of national policy, transforming it from a complex of folklore and ethnographic holidays into a

strategy for the formation of a Russian citizen, an oasis of prosperity cannot be created.

Thus, the change in ethnic proportions in the North Caucasian republics is in favor of the titular ethnic groups, the proportion of which has increased from 66% to 80%. The share of the rest of the population decreased from 34% to 20%. This has led to significant changes in the political, economic and cultural space, in which representatives of non-titular ethnic groups are beginning to feel increasing discomfort. This, in turn, means that without making serious efforts to change the social climate towards the Russian population to a more favorable one, the task of returning Russians to the North Caucasus remains a utopia.

Only if the state realizes that the declared modernization of the North Caucasus requires a massive return of Russians to the North Caucasus Federal District, and therefore the creation of appropriate conditions for this, can the goal be achieved in the foreseeable future.

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